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Starting approximately twenty years ago, and accelerating today, a clear
trend has come to define modern immigration law. Sometimes dubbed
"criminalization," the trend has been to import criminal justice norms into a
domain built upon a theory of civil regulation. An embryonic literature
chronicles this process well but fails to showcase its consciously asymmetric
form. This Article argues that immigration law has been absorbing the
theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with criminal
enforcement while explicitly rejecting the procedural ingredients of criminal
adjudication.
The normative thesis is that this asymmetry has skewed both discourse
and outcomes by excluding the careful consideration of the many, often
competing goals of a national immigration policy. At the macro level,
asymmetric incorporation has deterred policymakers from balancing law
enforcement against the equally vital mission of facilitating lawful
immigration. At the micro level, it has produced a deportation regime so
substantively harsh and inflexible that too often the penalties are cruelly
disproportionate to the transgressions. Procedurally, the preoccupation with
enforcement has left noncitizens in deportation proceedings exposed to large
risks of error when the personal stakes are high. In short, asymmetric
* John S. Lehmann University Professor, Washington University. Some of the ideas in
this Article were first presented at a workshop at the Baldy Center of the State University of
New York at Buffalo School of Law. The first draft was later presented at workshops at Temple
University, Washington University, and the University of Hong Kong. I am grateful to all the
workshop participants for their insightful feedback, and especially to Professors Sam Bagenstos,
Kathleen Brickey, Sam Buell, Mitch Crusto, Nora Demleitner, John Drobak, Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, Peter Joy, Daniel Kanstroom, F. Scott Kieff, David Konig, Ronald Levin,
Charles McManis, Teresa Miller, Neil Richards, Margo Schlanger, Peter Weidenbeck, and Juliet
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incorporation has virtually invited policymakers to abandon any sense of
proportion. To permit the fullest and most productive use of our national
immigration resources, this Article urges return to an immigration regime that
accepts the civil regulatory model as its foundation.
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L Introduction
There is an embryonic literature on the growing convergence of two
critical regulatory regimes-criminal justice and immigration control.' As
discussed below, 2 the two systems intersect at multiple points: Violations of
the immigration laws trigger broader, harsher, and more frequent criminal
consequences. Indeed, it is no longer rare for refugees seeking asylum to be
criminally prosecuted for illegal entry. Conversely, Congress has steadily
expanded the list of non-immigration-related crimes that trigger deportation and
other adverse immigration consequences, and the sheer numbers of
deportations on crime-related grounds have skyrocketed. The underlying
theories of deportation increasingly resemble those of criminal punishment.
Preventive detention and plea bargaining, longstanding staples of the criminal
justice system, have infiltrated the deportation process. Some of the same
government actors, including federal sentencing judges and state and local
police, are now frequently called upon to perform both criminal and
immigration functions simultaneously. Public perceptions of criminals and
1. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059 (2002) (describing
the use of immigration law as a law enforcement tool in the "war" on terrorism); Daniel
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented- Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th
"Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004) [hereinafter Kanstroom,
Criminalizing the Undocumented] (concluding that the convergence of the criminal justice
system and the immigration control system produces the worst features of both models); Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard
Cases Make Bad Laws, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1893-94 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom,
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment] (arguing that deportation of legal permanent
residents should be seen as punishment, and, therefore, substantive constitutional protections
should apply to deportation proceedings); Stephen H. Legomsky, The Alien Criminal
Defendant, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 105, 137 (1977) (cautioning against deportation on criminal
grounds except when the noncitizen's presence after release would pose an unusually serious
danger to the general public); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization ofImmigration Law:
Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 669,673 (1997) (focusing on
employer sanctions and marriage fraud and concluding that criminal sanctions are an
inappropriate deterrent); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and
Crime Control After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 85 (2005) [hereinafter
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries] (highlighting the social control dimensions of criminalization
of immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 660 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship
and Severity] (seeking to explain why criminal law and immigration law are converging and
why now); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REv. 367 (2006) (exposing a common link, rooted in membership theory, that has
increasingly come to unite these two once discrete fields of law).
2. See infra Part II (discussing the increased use of criminal enforcement strategies
entering immigration law and policy through five possible gates).
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foreigners have become ever more intertwined. Apprehension and removal of
those who violate the immigration laws command increasing priority over
programs for the lawful admission of immigrants. And the transfer of
immigration functions from the Department of Justice to the Department of
Homeland Security has changed the politics of immigration in ways that reward
officials for prioritizing criminal and other enforcement goals.
The trend to import the criminal justice model into the domain of
immigration law is unmistakable; it has begun to displace what I shall call the
civil regulatory model of immigration law. At first blush, one might expect
these trends to be a boon to immigrants, particularly those placed in deportation
(now called "removal") 3 proceedings. After all, the criminal justice system
operates under stringent constitutional and sub-constitutional constraints
familiar to all who have taken courses in criminal procedure.
For more than a century, however, the courts have uniformly insisted that
deportation is not punishment and that, therefore, the criminal procedural
safeguards do not apply in deportation proceedings.4 Those and similar
principles remain untouched by the gradual importation of criminal justice
norms into immigration law. As a result, the criminal justice model has had no
discernible benefits for immigrants. It has, however, had some harmful effects,
not just on immigrants but on native-born Americans as well.
The new literature on convergence chronicles well some of the ways in
which the criminal justice model has taken hold in immigration law. But it falls
short, I would argue, in failing to showcase the selective, asymmetric nature of
this importation process. A pattern has emerged: Those features of the
criminal justice model that can roughly be classified as enforcement have
indeed been imported. Those that relate to adjudication-in particular, the
bundle of procedural rights recognized in criminal cases-have been
consciously rejected. Rather than speak of importation of the criminaljustice
model, then, a more fitting observation would be that immigration law has been
absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal
enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of
a civil regulatory regime.
To the immigrant, of course, this state of affairs is the worst of both
worlds. Is it more broadly desirable nonetheless? This Article argues that it is
3. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1229 (2000) (using the term "removal" to include the
deportation of noncitizens from the interior). Despite the current statutory terminology, this
Article will use the word "deportation" as a shorthand to refer to the removal of non-United
States citizens from the interior.
4. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the broad range of legal consequences flowing from
the characterization of deportation as civil rather than punitive).
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not. From a procedural standpoint, this asymmetry leaves policymakers with
little political appetite for allowing adjudicative fairness and accuracy to temper
cost and efficiency concerns. From a substantive standpoint, it leaves them
little incentive to balance the government interests in deterring and
incapacitating immigration offenders against either the interests of the
immigrants themselves or the interests of the U.S. citizen family members,
friends, employers, and communities who are left behind. In short, the present
state of affairs virtually invites policymakers to abandon any sense of
proportion.
This Article asserts two propositions, one descriptive and the other
normative. The descriptive thesis is that the importation of the criminal justice
model into immigration law has indeed been asymmetric. Immigration law has
borrowed the enforcement components of criminal justice without the
corresponding adjudication components.
As for the normative thesis, I begin by acknowledging that there is nothing
inherently unjust or even unwise about importing only selected components of
another system. It is all right to take the wheat and leave the chaff. Nor is
asymmetry inherently evil. In this instance, however, the two components of
the criminal justice system cannot easily be divorced. The very reason for
building such stringent procedural safeguards into the criminal justice system is
that the consequences of criminal convictions are potentially so severe.5
Because the same statement can be made about deportation, especially when
the individual is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, severing the
enforcement norms from the corresponding adjudication norms is problematic.
At the micro level, the problems are ones of both fair procedure and substantive
proportion. At the macro level, their preoccupation with enforcement has
dampened policymakers' incentives to weigh the full set of often competing
objectives that should drive a national immigration policy-most importantly,
balancing the goal of deterring illegal immigration against the goal of
facilitating lawful immigration.
5. See the elegant concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370-72 (1970) (discussing the reasons for different standards of proof in civil and criminal
litigation). For example,
[T]he reason for different standards of proof in civil as opposed to criminal
litigation [is] apparent. In a civil suit between two private parties for money
damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an
erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict
in the plaintiff's favor .... In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the
social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty.
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
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If the terms "criminal justice model" and "civil regulatory model" are to be
used to help describe these trends, precise definitions become crucial. For
purposes of this Article, I shall define those terms by reference to the properties
I generally associate with each. The membrane that separates the two models is
not airtight, and their defining characteristics admittedly differ only in degree.
But those differences are substantial, for they reflect two distinct ways of
looking at the world.
Some of the distinguishing elements of the two models relate specifically
to enforcement. First and most generally, the criminal justice model, as I am
using the term, tends to focus principally on the bad guys. It seeks to influence
and constrain human behavior by targeting would-be and actual wrongdoers.
The civil regulatory model does this as well, but it assigns at least equal priority
to facilitating lawful and productive conduct. Second, compared to the civil
regulatory model, the criminal justice model places greater emphasis on
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation and less emphasis on rehabilitation
and redemption. The third distinguishing property relates to the forms and
severity of the penalties. The criminal justice system is more likely than the
civil regulatory model to mete out severe penalties generally, to rely on
incarceration in particular, and to prescribe lengthier durations of
confinement-as distinguished from the monetary fines and other economic
sanctions that more commonly characterize civil penalties. Fourth, the criminal
justice model is more likely to prioritize apprehension, arrest, and preventive
detention as part of the process; the civil regulatory model, as I define it for
present purposes, is less inclined to compromise personal liberty.
Other distinguishing properties relate to adjudication. First, the two
models allocate the risk of error in different ways. Better to acquit ten guilty
persons, the criminal justice model might say, than to convict one innocent
6person. Both are social harms, but in the criminal justice model the latter is
worse. In contrast, the civil regulatory model is either agnostic on that question
or at least willing to accept a higher risk of an erroneous penalty as a tradeoff
for lessening the risk of a wrongdoer escaping responsibility. These differences
show up most clearly in the rules that govern standard of proof.7 Second, the
6. That judgment is often traced to Blackstone, who said "[B]etter that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer." WiLLLAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358. The
same sentiment has its roots in much older sources, including the Book of Genesis, though there
is a disagreement over the acceptable ratio. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 399, 404-05; Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173,
177-78 (1997).
7. See supra note 5 (explaining precisely how the setting of the standard of proof
influences the relative distribution of opposing errors and why, therefore, the selection of the
474
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criminal justice model generally invests greater government resources than does
the civil regulatory model to minimize the risk of erroneous penalties; grand
juries, full judicial trials, and government-provided counsel serve as just a few
examples.
Part II gathers the evidence of the claimed importation of the criminal
enforcement model into immigration law. Synthesizing seemingly disparate
recent developments, it elaborates on five general ports through which criminal
enforcement norms have entered the realm. Part III explores the association of
immigrants and criminals in the public mind, contrasts those perceptions with
the empirical realities, and speculates as to what is driving the perceptions and
how they might be influencing immigration policymakers. Part IV considers
the flip side. It describes the conscious refusal of Congress and the courts to
import the corresponding criminal adjudication model. Together, those three
sections establish the asymmetric nature of this incorporation process. Part V
sketches the normative implications. It identifies the harms that flow from
asymmetric incorporation and advocates a return to an immigration regime that
accepts the civil regulatory model as its foundation.
11. Importing the Criminal Enforcement Model: Five Ports of Entry
A series of seemingly unrelated recent developments can now be seen to
form a clear, emerging trend in U.S. immigration law-heightened use of
criminal enforcement strategies, both in setting immigration priorities and in
executing them. Perhaps this trend simply mirrors a more general pattern of
using criminal law to regulate an ever widening range of human behavior, a
strategy that Jonathan Simon once called "governing through crime."8 Since
September 11, 2001, much of that activity has occurred in the counter-terrorism
sphere, prompting one commentator to coin the phrase "governing through
terror."9 I would suggest that the criminal enforcement model has entered
United States immigration law through at least five gates.
standard of proof should reflect the magnitude of the consequences of error). Justice Harlan's
logic could as easily be applied to other procedural safeguards.
8. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 171, 174 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
9. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 1, at 113-18.
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A. Attaching Criminal Consequences to Immigration Violations
Violations of the immigration laws, naturally enough, have consequences.
One of those consequences is removal from the United States, either from ports
of entry in the case of noncitizens who seek admissionl ° or from the interior in
the case of those who have already entered.' 1 In the past, as discussed below,
those civil "removal" proceedings were the principal mechanism for enforcing
the immigration laws.
But many of the same violations also constitute criminal offenses. The
clearest component of the new convergence has been the increased range,
severity, and frequency of those criminal prosecutions. Some have called this
trend the "criminalization" of immigration law. 2  As Teresa Miller has
observed, criminalization encompasses creating new immigration-related
crimes, increasing the minimum and maximum sentences for existing
immigration crimes, and bringing greater numbers of prosecutions.' 3 Unlike
some of the newer trends highlighted in this subpart, this strand of
criminalization has been in vogue for approximately twenty years, starting with
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA] .
Among other things, IRCA prohibited employers from knowingly hiring,
or continuing to employ, noncitizens who are not authorized to work.' 5 In
addition to imposing civil fines on violators, Congress made it a criminal
offense to engage in a "pattern or practice" of such violations.' 6 IRCA also
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000) (setting forth the categories of noncitizens ineligible
for admission).
11. See id. § 1227(a) (setting forth the classes of deportable noncitizens).
12. See, e.g., Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 640 (noting
that a trend toward increased convergence of the criminal justice and immigration control
systems has been apparent since the 1980s); Medina, supra note 1, at 671 ("Increasingly the
United States has looked to the criminal law to address the problem of undocumented
immigration."); Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra note 1, at 617 (defining the term
"criminalization of immigration law" as a general way of describing the closer relationship that
has developed between the criminal justice and immigration systems); Helen Morris, Zero
Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1317, 1317 (Aug. 29, 1997) ("One of the most striking aspects of immigration law in the past
decade is its increased criminalization."). Juliet Stumpf has coined the term "crimmigration" to
describe this and some related phenomena. Stumpf, supra note 1, at 368.
13. Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra note 1, at 639-42.
14. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1342a(a)(1)-(2) (2000) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring
or continuing to employ unauthorized workers).
16. See IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2000) (imposing a fine and/or
imprisonment for violations of the section). See Medina, supra note 1, at 671-73 (observing
THE NEW PATH OF IMMIGRATION LAW
criminalized using false documents for the purpose of evading the employer
sanctions laws.' 7 Just months later, Congress followed with the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments [IMFA]; one of their provisions made it a crime
to marry for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.'
8
Since 1986, Congress has liberally expanded the list of immigration
offenses. The Immigration Act of 1990 created the crime of entrepreneurship
fraud; it covers those who establish commercial enterprises for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws. 19 The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 199420 made it a criminal offense for a noncitizen to
attempt an unlawful reentry into the United States after having been convicted
of three misdemeanors involving either drugs or crimes against the person.
21
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
[IIRIRA] 22 created several new federal immigration crimes, including driving
above the speed limit while fleeing an immigration checkpoint,23 knowingly
failing to disclose one's role in helping to prepare a false immigration
application,24 filing an immigration application that contains no "reasonable
basis in law or fact, 2 5 knowingly making a false claim of U.S. citizenship for
any of several designated purposes, 26 and failing to cooperate in the execution
of one's removal order.27 A controversial bill passed in 2005 by the House of
that both the employer sanctions laws and the marriage fraud laws reach both United States
citizen and noncitizen offenders).
17. See IRCA § 103(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2000) (imposing a fine and/or imprisonment
for using a fraudulent document to evade employer sanction laws).
18. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 § 2(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)
(2000) (criminalizing marriage fraud). These 1986 offenses are the subject of Medina, supra
note 1.
19. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 121(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(d) (2000) (imposing
criminal penalties on those who establish commercial enterprises for the purpose of evading
immigration laws).
20. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
21. Id. § 130001(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2000).
22. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18
U.S.C.).
23. Id. § 108, 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2000).
24. Id. § 213, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2000).
25. Id. § 214, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2000).
26. Id. § 215, 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e)-(f) (2000).
27. IIRIRA § 307, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000).
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Representatives would have created several additional new immigration
crimes.28
During the same era in which it has been busily creating new immigration-
related crimes, Congress has been steadily increasing both the fines and the
lengths of the prison sentences for existing immigration-related crimes.
Examples abound. In 1988, Congress increased the criminal sentences for the
offenses of unlawful reentry after deportation, if deportation resulted from a
felony (more if the underlying crime was an "aggravated felony")29 and for
aiding certain classes of inadmissible noncitizens to enter unlawfully.30 The
Immigration Act of 1990 prescribed higher sentences for such crimes as
overstaying one's crew member permit, concealing unlawfully present
noncitizens, unlawful entry, and aiding the unlawful entry of noncitizens who
are inadmissible on national security grounds.31 The Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 again raised the prison sentences for
unlawful reentry after deportations that followed criminal convictions, for
immigration-related employment fraud, for various forms of passport or visa
fraud, and for assisting noncitizens to enter unlawfully.3 2 In 1996, IIRIRA yet
again increased the sentences for assisting noncitizens to enter unlawfully, both
by lengthening the prison terms directly and by making the offense a possible
RICO violation.33 The immigration reform bill that passed the House of
28. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2005); see, e.g., IIRIRA § 201 (a)(1) (knowingly hiring ten or
more unauthorized workers in a year); id. § 202(a) (expanding the range of activities that would
constitute illegal assistance to undocumented immigrants); id. § 203(2) (being unlawfully
present in the United States); id. § 203(3) (knowingly misrepresenting the existence or
circumstances of a marriage); id. § 213 (engaging in a wide range of passport and visa fraud
crimes). The subsequently enacted Senate bill, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of
2006, S. 2611, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), differed so markedly from the House bill that the
legislation ultimately failed.
29. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7345, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000).
30. Id. § 7346, 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (2000).
31. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 543(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1282, 1325-28 (increasing
criminal fines for certain immigration related crimes).
32. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 60024, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2000) (enhancing penalties for smuggling noncitizens); id § 130001(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(1) (2000) (establishing criminal penalties for noncitizens who attempt to reenter the
United States unlawfully after having been convicted of three misdemeanors involving either
drugs or crimes against the person); id. 30009, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1541-47 (2000) (increasing
penalties for passport and visa fraud).
33. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C, §§ 202, 203 (Sept. 30, 1996).
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Representatives in 2005 similarly would have increased the criminal sentences
for a range of immigration crimes.34
Apart from the creation of new immigration crimes and the statutory
increases in the permissible sentences, the sheer numbers tell a similar story.
Federal criminal prosecutions of immigration violators began to escalate
sharply in the 1980s. For immigration felonies and class A misdemeanors
(which generally do not include simple entry without inspection), Justice
Department statistics show almost a tripling of prosecutions from 1984 to
1994. 35 Following Congress's enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, another jump
occurred. From fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 1998, prosecutions for all
immigration offenses leaped from 17,807 to 22,857 before leveling off through
2003.36 In fiscal year 2004, DHS referrals of immigration cases for criminal
cases suddenly rose by 65% from the prior year; prosecutions of these crimes
rose by 82% and actual convictions by 70%. 37 Immigration cases are now the
34. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 202(a) (2005) (assisting noncitizens who
are unlawfully present); id. § 203(3) (criminalizing immigration marriage fraud); id § 203(4)
(criminalizing immigration entrepreneurship fraud); id. § 204 (criminalizing certain forms of
illegal entry); id. § 205 (criminalizing assisting illegal entry); id. § 603 (criminalizing failing to
cooperate with arrangements for one's own removal); id. § 618 (criminalizing document fraud
and, for persons unlawfully present, drug trafficking and crimes of violence); id. § 706(4)
(dramatically increasing both the fines and the prison sentences for a pattern and practice of
hiring unauthorized workers).
35. See Morris, supra note 12, at 1318 (showing an increase of immigration felonies and
Class A misdemeanors prosecuted in federal court from 1,186 in 1984 to 3,377 in 1994); see
also Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 655 (stating that "[tihe total
number of prosecutions for immigration offenses has risen dramatically in the past decade from
14,845 in 1994 to 23,852 in 2002.").
36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 180 tbl.49 (2004). For actual convictions, the
corresponding figures were 15,219 and 20,768. Id. at 181 tbl.50. In 2003, approximately two-
thirds of the immigration convictions were for simple entry without inspection (14,199),
followed by unlawful reentry of those who had previously been deported (4938), and then by
assisting others to enter unlawfully (1612). Id.
37. Department of Homeland Security: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse,
Immigration Enforcement: New Findings, fig. 1, http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/current (2005)
[hereinafter Immigration Enforcement] (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Oddly, the vast bulk of that year's increase was attributable to one
judicial district-the Southern District of Texas. Id. at fig. 4. The authors of the report
speculate that either the priorities of the particular U.S. Attorney or the available staffing levels
explain the disproportionate share of the increase traceable to one district. Id. Interestingly
also, the median sentence imposed for immigration crimes plummeted that year, from fifteen
months to one month, presumably because the additional immigration cases consisted almost
entirely of the least serious entry without inspection offenses. Id. at fig. 3; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (providing that "any alien who.., eludes examination or inspection by immigration
officers... shall, for the first commission of any such offense, be fined under Title 18 or
imprisoned not more than 6 months").
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largest single category of federal prosecutions, accounting for 32% of the
annual total.38
Similar events have been playing out more recently in the specific realm of
unlawful employment. In 1986, Congress, for the first time, prescribed civil
fines and, for pattern and practice cases, criminal penalties for employers that
knowingly hire anyone not authorized to work.39 Enforcement had generally
been lax, but that is now changing.40 In June 2006, DHS published a proposed
rule that lays out specific expectations of employers when either DHS or the
Social Security Administration notifies them that an employee name and social
security number do not match.4' Moreover, whereas in 2002 the old
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated only 25 criminal
charges under the employer sanctions laws, in 2005 its successor agency made
445 criminal arrests of employers.42
Finally, the government in recent years has been increasingly prone to
bring criminal charges against asylum seekers for entering the United States
with false documents. Most of the reports involve Haitians in south Florida.
According to one newspaper account, "local attorneys report that some asylum
seekers are arrested upon arrival at Miami International Airport while others
have been charged after months of immigration detention., 43  The U.S.
Attorney's Office in Miami obtained 75-80 indictments of asylum seekers on
these charges from the fall of 2003 through April 2004.44 Because asylum
seekers frequently resort to false documents both to escape their countries of
38. Immigration Enforcement, supra note 37, at fig. 6.
39. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (describing the IRCA prohibitions on
employers hiring noncitizens).
40. See Julia Preston, U.S. Puts Onus on Employers of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2006, at Al, A16 (indicating that "while the old immigration agency brought 25 criminal
charges against employers in 2002, this year Immigration and Customs Enforcement has already
made 445 criminal arrests of employers").
41. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,281, 34,281-34,282 (June 14, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 247(a)) (detailing a
proposed rule by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to amend the regulations
relating to the unlawful hiring or continued employment of unauthorized workers).
42. Preston, supra note 40, at A16. The comparison is imperfect, of course, since not all
criminal arrests lead to prosecutions.
43. Tanya Weinberg, Asylum Seekers Face U.S. Charges: Prosecutors Say Dozens
Entered Country Illegally, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 16, 2003.
44. See Kathleen Sullivan, This Year in Detention Law and Policy: Immigration
Detention Developments May 2003-April 2004,9 BENDER'S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 851, 861
(2004) (summarizing a report from the Florida Immigration Advocacy Center indicating that
seventy-five to eighty federal indictments have taken place because of a directive from the
Florida Attorney General to prosecute asylum-seekers who arrive with false documents).
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persecution and to secure transportation to their intended countries of asylum,
and because criminal penalties on asylum seekers for unlawful entry are
questionable under international law,45 these criminal prosecutions raise
difficult issues. Appropriate or not, they are further examples of the
dramatically increased reliance on the criminal enforcement model in
immigration.
One of the arguments that will appear in the final part of this paper is that
importing the criminal enforcement model into immigration law without the
accompanying criminal adjudication model exposes the affected noncitizens to
harsh consequences without the necessary procedural safeguards. One
objection to that argument might be that the scenario does not occur when the
government charges an immigration violator with a criminal offense, since in
that proceeding all the usual criminal safeguards will apply. Anticipating that
objection, I would offer three observations. First, the trend toward
criminalizing and prosecuting immigration violations is highlighted here only
as one example of the injection of the criminal enforcement model into
immigration law; other examples make up the remainder of this section.
Second, because deportation has been held not to be punishment,46 the
constitutional bar on double jeopardy47 does not preclude the government from
bringing deportation proceedings once the person has completed his or her
criminal sentence. Indeed, even if the person was already deportable because
of the underlying immigration violation, the criminal conviction might add
prison time, strip the person of otherwise available discretionary relief from
deportation, require the person to remain outside the United States for a longer
period after deportation, and trigger other adverse consequences.48 The
45. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 174 (providing that the parties to the agreement "shall not impose penalties, on
account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened .... enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they ... show good cause for their illegal entry or presence"). But see
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 187 (Erika Feller et
al. eds., 2003) (suggesting that, despite Article 31, asylum seekers are still placed in detention
facilities throughout North America, Europe, and Australia because of their illegal entry or
presence).
46. See infra Part III.A (discussing the perceived link between legal immigration and
illegal immigration).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (establishing that no person shall "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
48. See infra Part II.B (discussing aggravated felonies-one situation which may trigger
adverse deportation consequences).
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criminal prosecution is therefore an add-on, not a substitute, for deportation.
Third, the Department of Justice authorizes federal prosecutors to enter into
plea agreements with deportable criminal defendants. Under the terms of the
authorized agreements, the defendant stipulates to deportation-thus waiving
even the limited procedural protections otherwise available in deportation
proceedings-in exchange for a reduced criminal sentence.49
B. Attaching Immigration Consequences to Criminal Convictions
50
Just as more and more immigration violations are culminating in
criminal convictions, so too are more and more criminal convictions
culminating in deportation or other adverse immigration consequences. And
just as the former trend has been dubbed the "criminalization" of immigration
law, at least one commentator has called the latter trend the
"immigrationization" of criminal law.5' This subsection describes two sub-
strands of the latter-the proliferation of new crime-related deportation
grounds and other related legal changes, and a soaring number of actual
crime-related removals.
As elaborated elsewhere,5 2 a criminal conviction can damage one's
immigration status in many ways. It can result in denial of a visa or denial of
admission to the United States.53 It can be a ground for deporting a person
who is already in the United States. 4 It can bar otherwise available
discretionary relief and can be a negative factor in the exercise of a statutory
discretion.55 It can result in mandatory preventive detention while removal
49. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, STIPULATED
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPORTATION IN PLEA AGREEMENTS, § 1921, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading_ room/usam/title9/crmO921 .htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). I thank Sam Buell for this observation.
50. See generally DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
CRIMES (8th rel. 2006) (providing the leading treatise on the immigration consequences of
criminal activity); Congressional Research Service, Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Activities, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Oct. 23, 2006 (covering the proposals made by the
109th Congress to expand the immigration consequences of criminal activity).
51. Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra note 1, at 618; Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented, supra note 1, at 653-54; Stumpf, supra note 1, at 376 n.35.
52. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 530-65 (4th
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charges are pending.56 It can destroy one's eligibility for naturalization.57
Because the body of law that concerns the impact of criminal activity on
noncitizens is now vast and well covered in other sources,58 and because the
most important provisions tend to revolve around deportation, this subpart will
offer only a brief summary focused principally on deportation.
The Immigration and Nationality Act contains numerous crime-related
grounds for "deportability,, 59 but one concept-the "aggravated felony"-has
accounted for the steadiest and most expansive growth in the range of crimes
that give rise to removal. This term made its debut in U.S. immigration law
when Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.60 Among other
things, that statute renders deportable any noncitizen who is convicted of an
"aggravated felony" after entry (now admission) into the United States.6 '
Unlike one other major category of crime-related deportability grounds,62 the
aggravated felony ground applies regardless of either the length of the criminal
sentence or the amount of time spent in the United States. Moreover,
aggravated felonies eliminate almost all the major avenues of discretionary
relief from removal, including even asylum;63 they trigger mandatory
56. Id.
57. LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 530-65.
58. See generally KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 50 (providing a close look at
the impact of criminal activity on the immigration status of non-citizens); 6 CHARLES GORDON
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05 (2006) (analyzing the issue of deportability
based on the commission of criminal offenses).
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (providing that "[a]ny alien.., in and admitted to the
United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within
one or more of the.., classes of deportable aliens" as outlined in this section). Those who have
not been admitted to the United States (whether they are now at ports of entry or in the interior)
are said to be "inadmissible" if they fall within any of the roughly analogous grounds
enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (providing that "aliens who are
inadmissible under the following [section] are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be
admitted to the United States"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (establishing crime-related
deportability grounds).
60. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
61. Id. § 7344 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000)).
62. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (providing that a non-U.S. citizen who
"is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years... after the date
of admission[,]" for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed, is deportable).
63. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 573 (discussing the negative relationship between
aggravated felonies and asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (providing that
"an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been
convicted of a particularly serious crime[,]" and accordingly, the "Attorney General may by
regulation establish additional limitations and conditions.., under which an alien shall be
ineligible for asylum").
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preventive detention; 64 and they bar return to the United States for life, absent
special permission from the Secretary of Homeland Security.65
In its nascent 1988 form, the aggravated felony definition was defined
narrowly, in keeping with the harsh consequences just described. The term
included only murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking.66
It is now a colossus. A long series of amendments have added crime after
crime to the list. The Immigration Act of 1990 added "crimes of violence,, 67 a
term broadly defined to take in a sweeping range of state and federal offenses
that require only the use of some physical force against the person or property
of another or, in the case of a felony, a "substantial risk" of such force.68 The
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 added theft,
receipt of stolen property, burglary, trafficking in fraudulent documents, RICO,
certain prostitution offenses, fraud or deceit, tax evasion, and people
smuggling-some of these only if a certain amount of money was involved or if
the maximum possible sentence was five years. 69 The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] 70 then weakened some of the
sentence requirements for qualification as an aggravated felony and added still
more crimes-commercial bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling
offenses, vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a
witness. 71 Just a few months later, Congress added sexual abuse of a minor and
64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2000) (allowing the Attorney General to take into custody
any alien who has committed an aggravated felony).
65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000) (providing that aliens who have
committed aggravated felonies are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the
United States except upon special permission from the Secretary of Homeland Security).
66. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4496-
4470 (providing that "[t]he term 'aggravated felony' means murder, any drug trafficking
crime. . . , or any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices ... , committed within the
United States").
67. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501 (a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978,5048
(amending the definition of "aggravated felony" to include "crimes of violence").
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000) (defining the term "crime of violence") Crime of violence
is:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
Id. A narrowing interpretation was adopted in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4-6 (2004).
69. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305.
70. Id. § 203.
71. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
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rape, while reducing most of the remaining five-year sentencing requirements
to one-year requirements, thus dramatically expanding the set of aggravated
felonies further.72 The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003 then added various crimes relating to human trafficking.73 From its
humble origins, the aggravated felony definition now has twenty-one subparts,
and the new prongs are generally applied retroactively to individuals who
committed the crimes before Congress made them aggravated felonies.74 The
immigration reform bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2005 would
have added a prong for manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary).75
The expansions mean that an "aggravated felony" need no longer be either
aggravated or a felony.76 Cases in which long-term, lawful permanent residents
have been ordered removed on the basis of seemingly minor offenses that fit the
statutory aggravated felony definition have attracted the attention of
commentators and journalists alike.77 Given the severe consequences that
Stat. 1214. These new crimes were made aggravated felonies as long as the maximum possible
sentences were five years, even if the sentences actually imposed were shorter. Id. In contrast,
some of the other aggravated felony categories are defined to require a certain sentence
imposed. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F)-(G), (P), (RHS) (requiring a "term of
imprisonment," a phrase defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(B) to mean the sentence actually
imposed, whether or not suspended).
72. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3009, 3636-37 (amending the definition of"aggravated
felony").
73. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193
§ 4(b)(5), 117 Stat. 2875, 2879 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 101 l(a)(43)(K)(iii)) (adding "peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons" to the definition of "aggravated
felony").
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(43) (stating that an aggravated felony could be found despite
the fact that the conviction occurred prior to enactment of any portion of the aggravated felony
provision).
75. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 613(a)(1) (2005) (as passed by House, Dec. 16, 2005)
(proposing to expand the definition of "aggravated felony" to include manslaughter).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1193 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (finding
that defendant's conviction for shoplifting, a misdemeanor, and his suspended sentence of
twelve months imprisonment qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)
because all that is required is a conviction with a sentence of at least one year imprisonment);
United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 788 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that defendant's
misdemeanor conviction for petit larceny satisfied the statutory requirement for aggravated
felony because defendant received the maximum sentence of one-year imprisonment).
77. See, e.g., Joseph Justin Rollin, Humpty Dumpty Logic: Arguing Against the
"Aggravated Misdemeanor" in Immigration Law, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 445,460 (2001)
(arguing that the current definition of "aggravated felony" has the greatest negative impact on
those who relied on earlier definitions and are retroactively subject to the newer interpretation);
Anthony Lewis, This Has Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,2000, at Al3
(publicizing the case of Mary Anne Gehris, a long-term, lawful permanent resident who was
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follow the labeling of a crime as an aggravated felony, these developments raise
serious questions of proportionality. Those questions are taken up in Part V
below.
The number of actual crime-related removals has kept pace with the
proliferation of new crime-related removal grounds. From 1908, when
deportation statistics were first compiled,78 through 1986, when IRCA was
passed, crime-related removals rarely, if ever, reached 2,000 per year.
79
Starting in 1987, the numbers began to rise quickly. They leaped to 4,385 that
year and rose every year thereafter until 1999, when they reached 42,014,80 a
tenfold increase in twelve years.
facing a deportation hearing after a misdemeanor battery conviction for pulling the hair of
another woman); Anthony Lewis, Measure of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A13
(reporting that Ms. Gehris was saved from deportation only because she applied for and
received a pardon from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles); Patrick J. McDonnell,
Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at BI (reporting deportation of
twenty-nine-year lawful permanent resident for sale of $10 worth of marijuana and the
subsequent suicide of his despondent son).
78. Except for the short-lived Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, which was never
invoked, see GORDON ETAL., supra note 58, at § 71.01 [2] [a], the first federal deportation statute
was not enacted until 1888. See Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566 (giving the
Secretary of the Treasury the power to deport unlawful immigrants).
79. By "crime-related removals," I mean cases in which criminal convictions were the
actual grounds for removal. There might well be additional cases in which noncitizens who
happen to have been convicted of crimes were ordered removed on other grounds. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics aggregate the figures by decade from 1908 through 1970
and by year thereafter. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
2004, Enforcement, Table 45: Aliens Deported by Administrative Reasonfor Removal: Fiscal
Years 1908-80, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk4En.shtm [hereinafter
DHS, Table 45] (reporting deportations through 1980) (last visited Nov. 16,2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). From 1908 to 1970, the decade with by far the greatest
number of crime-related removals was the 1930s, when the total was 17,705 deportations-an
annual average of 1771. See id. (calculating the total by combining "Criminal Violations" and
"Narcotics Violations," which are displayed separately). For deportation numbers for the years
1981 through 1986, see U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
2004, Enforcement, Table 46: Aliens Deported by Administrative Reason for Removal: Fiscal
Years 1981-90, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk04En.shtm [hereinafter
DHS, Table 46] (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See DHS, Table 46, supra note 79 (reporting the data for 1987 to 1990). Data for
1987 to 1990 is compiled by adding the figures in the columns headed "Convictions for
Criminal or Narcotics Violations" and "Related to Criminal or Narcotics Violations" as found
on DHS, Table 46. It is not clear what actions would be counted under the latter column, but
such violations are minimal compared to the numbers listed under the column for convictions.
For the deportation data for 1991 to 1999, which is listed under the single categorical heading
"Criminal," see U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2004,
Enforcement, Table 42: Aliens Deported by Administrative Reason for Removal: Fiscal Years
1991-2004, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk04En.shtm [hereinafter
DHS, Table 42] (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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C. Prioritizing Criminal Enforcement Theory in Immigration Law
With one ultimately insignificant exception,8' U.S. law did not authorize
deportation until 1888. That year Congress prescribed the return of those who
had entered the United States in violation of an existing ban on the admission
82of noncitizen contract laborers. A more general provision for deporting those
who had entered in violation of the immigration laws followed three years
later.83 Similarly, today one may be removed from the United States for
entering the country while within one of the inadmissible classes or for entering
without inspection or by fraud.84
Importantly, as other writings have observed, each of these deportation
laws was in effect a check on the admissions process. 85 Each called for
deporting those who were not supposed to have been admitted in the first place.
As I have suggested elsewhere, a rough analogy would be the rescission of a
voidable contract.86 Only slightly different are those provisions that prescribe
deportation for the noncitizen who was properly admitted but who subsequently
violated the conditions that were imposed on him or her at the time of
admission.87 Perhaps the person overstayed the allotted time; or perhaps the
From 1999 to 2004, the number of crime-related removals has leveled off. See id. (reporting an
average of 40,372 crime-related removals each year since 1999).
81. The one exception was the Alien Act of 1798, Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570, 571, which authorized the President to deport aliens whom he deemed dangerous. This
statute was not renewed when it expired two years later, and no one was ever deported under it.
See, e.g., FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS 53
(1976) (stating that the Alien Act of 1798 was unpopular and was allowed to expire at the end
of its two-year term); MILTON R. KONvITz, CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 95-96 (1953) (stating
that during the two years the Alien Act was in effect, no immigrant was expelled); MILTON R.
KONviTZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 46 (1946) (stating that the "notorious"
Alien Act of 1798 was never used to expel immigrants and expired after two years).
82. See Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566 (empowering the Secretary of
the Treasury to determine which immigrants were in the United States illegally and to demand
their return to their home countries).
83. Act ofMar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11,26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (permitting the deportation of
illegally present immigrants within one year of arrival).
84. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(b)(A), (C), 1227 (a)(1)(A) (2006) (rendering removable
those persons who enter while inadmissible, without permission, or by fraud).
85. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 58, at § 71.01[2][a] ("Barring the admission of
undesirables and ejecting those who evaded the bar were regarded as different sides of the same
coin."); LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 500 ("Deportation was originally conceived as a device
for removing those noncitizens who should not have entered in the first place....").
86. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 500 (stating that the theory of deportation based on
a wrong later committed by an immigrant who properly entered is analogous to a remedy for
breach of contract).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2006) (rendering deportable immigrants who fail to
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person was admitted as a student, for example, but failed to enroll or remain in
school. The analogy would be to breach a valid contract. The common
denominator in all these removal grounds is that they are designed to remedy
lapses related to the person's entry. Each is a remedy for either a flawed entry
or noncompliance with the terms of a proper admission.
Different in kind are those deportation grounds that hinge on post-entry
conduct unrelated to the person's entry or admission. These include all the
deportation grounds that rest on post-entry criminal convictions" and some
others as well. 89 Their common objective is simply to remove from our midst
those noncitizens who are thought to be undesirable.
As discussed in Part IV below, approximately thirty years ago I questioned
the courts' insistence that deportation is not punishment, stressing the
resemblance that the traditional theories of criminal punishment-particularly
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation-bear to the theories of
deportation.9" Building on those observations, Professor Daniel Kanstroom has
contributed an important insight. He has argued that, given the traditional
purposes of criminal punishment, the case for classifying deportation as
punishment becomes strongest when the particular deportation grounds are
based on criminal convictions or other post-entry conduct-as distinguished
from those grounds that are linked solely to the original entries.9
While that subject will be addressed more fully in Part IV, the critical
point here is that in the past twenty years the statistics establish a marked
increase in the relative attention that the government has paid to the post-entry,
generally crime-related, deportation grounds. From 1908 through 1986 there
were large fluctuations, but, for that era as a whole, approximately 7% of all
deportations were on crime-related post-entry grounds.9 2 Immediately after the
maintain nonimmigrant status or who violate a condition of entry).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006).
89. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(3), (4), (6) (2006) (rendering deportable, respectively,
noncitizens who fail to register or falsify documents; threaten the national security; or
unlawfully vote in federal or state elections); cf id. § 1227(a)(5) (becoming a public charge
within five years of entry "from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry" also
makes a noncitizen deportable).
90. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing the argument in greater
detail).
91. See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, andPunishment, supra note 1, at 1893-
94 ("Deportation of long-term lawful permanent residents for post-entry criminal conduct seems
in most respects to be a form of punishment.").
92. From 1908 through 1980 there were 56,669 deportations on criminal grounds (48,330
"Criminal Violations" plus another 8,339 "Narcotics Violations"). DHS, Table 45, supra note
79. During that period the total number of deportations on all grounds was 812,915. Id. From
1981 through 1986, the figures were 6,433 deportations on criminal grounds (5,826
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enactment of IRCA in 1986, that percentage rose dramatically, from 8% in
1986 to 20% the next year, remaining above 20% in every year since and
exceeding 50% for three consecutive years in the early 1990s.
93
These percentage increases in the allocation of deportation resources to
crime-related cases are highly relevant. If Kanstroom is right that the crime-
related deportation grounds best reflect the theory of deportation as
punishment, then the government's increased attention to those grounds
suggests that its deportation priorities similarly reflect increased reliance on the
underlying theories of criminal enforcement-as distinguished from those that
relate to entry or admission.
D. Importing Strategies of Criminal Law Enforcement
Recent years have witnessed the accelerated incorporation of several
specific attributes of the U.S. criminal enforcement machinery. Two are
considered here-preventive detention and plea-bargaining.
1. Preventive Detention
Proceedings to determine whether to remove a noncitizen from the United
States can take many months or longer. As is true in criminal cases, the law
authorizes preventive detention while these proceedings are pending. As
discussed below, such detention is mandatory in several large categories of
cases. Ordinarily, however, the DHS has the discretion to detain, release on
bond, or "parole" the subject of a removal proceeding pending the removal
decision.94 Under the relevant regulations, release is permitted when the
individual "would not pose a danger to property or persons, and.., is likely to
"Convictions for Criminal or Narcotics Violations" plus 607 "Related to Criminal or Narcotics
Violations"). DHS, Table 46, supra note 79. The totals for the two periods combined were
63,102 deportations on criminal grounds out of a total of 923,664 deportations, or 7% of all
deportations.
93. In 1986, there were 1,873 criminal deportations (1,708 "convictions for Criminal
Narcotics Violations" plus 165 "Related to Criminal or Narcotics Violations") out of a total of
22,314 deportations, representing 8% of deportations. DHS, Table 46, supra note 79. In 1987,
the corresponding figures were 4,385 criminal deportations (4,111 plus 274) out of 22,342 total
deportations, or 20%. Id. For 1998 through 1990, see id. From 1991 on, see DHS, Table 42,
supra note 80. The percentage of criminal deportations equaled or exceeded 50% in 1993
(53%), 1994 (54%), and 1995 (50%). Id.
94. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (granting discretionary power pursuant to a warrant
from the attorney general).
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appear for any future proceeding." 95 The number of individuals subjected to
either mandatory or discretionary preventive detention has soared in recent
years.
96
On this score, deportation law actually does more than draw from the
criminal enforcement model; it expands this criminal justice invention by
making detention both mandatory and indefinite. Those two features, as well as
the application of preventive detention to the contexts of asylum and national
security, have been among the more significant and controversial uses of
immigration detentions and are worth considering here in more detail.
Mandatory detention made its immigration debut with the enactment of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 97 The concept applied only to people who
had been convicted of "aggravated felonies," a term then narrowly defined to
cover only murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking.98 In all other
cases, detention pending deportation proceedings remained discretionary.
Since then, the grounds for mandatory detention have multiplied. In 1996,
Congress mandated detention for individuals who are either inadmissible or
deportable on almost any of the crime-related grounds (not just aggravated
felonies), inadmissible or deportable on terrorism-related grounds, arriving
passengers, and awaiting the execution of removal orders.99 In 2001, the
USA PATRIOT Act further expanded the terrorism ground for mandatory
95. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2006).
96. Accord Stumpf, supra note 1, at 393-94; see Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra
note 1, at 649 (reporting a quadrupling in immigration detentions from an average daily
population of 5500 in 1994 to 22,000 in 2001); see also Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida,
30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 551, 551-52 (1999) (providing statistics showing a threefold
increase in the number of persons in INS custody between 1994 and 1998). For some
thoughtful commentary on the duration and conditions of immigration detention, see MARK
Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 48-67, 137-54 (2004); Margaret
H. Taylor, DetainedAliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of
the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1088-89, 1111-25 (1995)
(describing conditions in immigrant detention facilities).
97. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a), 102 Stat. 4181,
4470 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)) ("The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien convicted of an aggravated felony upon completion of the alien's sentence for
such conviction."). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories,
Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 531 (1999).
98. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of1988 § 7342 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1107(a)
(2000)) (defining aggravated felony).
99. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A), 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D) (requiring that
asylum seekers, noncitizens not clearly admissible, and criminal noncitizens be detained or
taken into custody). In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of mandatory detention.
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detention. 100  The immigration reform bill passed by the House of
Representatives in 2005 would have required preventive detention, pending
removal proceedings, for anyone attempting an illegal entry into the United
States' 01 or any member of a "criminal street gang."1
0 2
A second controversial practice has been the growing use of indefinite
detention. The problem is serious. What should the United States government
do if a noncitizen has been ordered removed, but the country of origin refuses
to readmit the person and the U.S. government believes that the person would
either abscond or endanger public safety if released? On the one hand, should
the person be held in captivity indefinitely, perhaps for life, when he or she
either has never been convicted of a crime or has fully served any criminal
sentence? On the other hand, should the government be forced to release a
noncitizen whom it regards as either dangerous or a flight risk, simply because
no other country will take the person?
Even before September 11, 2001, the United States was beginning to
choose the former option with greater and greater frequency.'0 3 As of February
2001, the former INS was detaining approximately 3000 noncitizens for
indefinite durations. 1 4 In June of that year, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v.
Davis °5 interpreted the relevant statutory provision as forbidding detention ofdeportable10 6 noncitizens once there is no longer a "significant likelihood of
100. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, §§ 411-12 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
345-52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1189, 1226(a)) (providing terrorism-related definitions
and mandating detention for suspected terrorists).
101. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 401 (as passed by House, Dec. 16, 2005) (mandating
detention for noncitizens apprehended at U.S. ports of entry or along the international land and
maritime border of the United States but providing an exception for noncitizens paroled into the
United States for "urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit").
102. See id. § 608(d) (mandating detention of criminal street gang members).
103. There are, of course, modified versions of these options. The government can, and
does, make use of supervised release, often after periodic review to assess the levels of risk
involved. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (2006) (providing for conditional release and
supervision).
104. See Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Indefinite Detention Cases, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 397, 397 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court's consideration of two cases
involving indefinite detention in February 2001 "will affect the estimated 3,000 persons
currently subject to indefinite detention").
105. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,697 (2001) ("We cannot find here ... any clear
indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to hold indefinitely in
confinement an alien ordered removed.").
106. For the Court's extension of this holding to inadmissible noncitizens, see Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
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removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."'107 The court mentioned casually
terrorism or other special circumstances" might present a different case.108
After the events of September 11, the government seized on that dictum,
declaring that not only terrorism, but also "highly contagious disease that is a
threat to public safety," "serious adverse foreign policy consequences," and
classification as "specially dangerous" because of commission of a crime of
violence or a behavioral disorder would justify indefinite detention, even after
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable. 109 The government also began to
impose release conditions that it knew the person would be unable to meet (for
example, imposing a high bond amount) and taking back into custody
individuals alleged to have violated their conditions of release." 0
Detention of noncitizens on national security grounds has become a
broader part of the counter-terrorism strategy in the post-September 11 era. In
the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress authorized the Attorney General to "certify"
any noncitizen whom there were reasonable grounds to believe was either
inadmissible or deportable on certain national security grounds."'1 Upon such a
certification, detention pending removal proceedings was to be mandatory, and
even indefinite detention was explicitly approved as long as the case was
reviewed every six months. 112 As others have noted, that procedure has never
been invoked; the government has circumvented the few limitations built into
the USA PATRIOT Act by claiming the inherent authority to detain
indefinitely in connection with its ordinary powers in removal proceedings."
13
107. Zadvyas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court found the statute capable of alternative
interpretations and chose the one it did in order to avoid serious constitutional problems. See
id. at 690-99 (noting that "[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a
serious constitutional problem" and thus "interpreting the statute to avoid a serious
constitutional threat").
108. See id. at 696 (noting that the Court was not "consider[ing] terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention").
109. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(b)-(d), (f) (2006) (providing conditions that may be invoked to
"continue detention," despite the absence of a "significant likelihood that the alien will be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future").
110. See Thomas Hutchins, Detention of Aliens: An Overview of Current Law,
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Apr. 2003, at 1, 10 (arguing that one mechanism used by the
Department of Homeland Security to "skirt" limits on the detention of noncitizens is the
imposition of"conditions of release which the alien cannot meet in the first place, such as a high
bond").
111. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 § 412, 8 U.S.C. 1226a(a)(3) (providing the
circumstances for certification of foreign terrorist suspects by the Attorney General).
112. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226a(a)(I)-(3), (6)-(7) (requiring the Attorney General to detain
certified noncitizens and review certification every six months).
113. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 844-54 (noting that "[a]s of March 26,2003,
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All this is in addition to the controversial long-term detention of suspected Al
Qaeda and Taliban combatants at the Guantanamo Naval Base."
4
Finally, the government in recent years has made widespread use of
detention in the context of asylum. Generally, the government has the same
statutory discretion to detain asylum seekers during removal proceedings as it
does to detain any other noncitizens in those proceedings. In addition,
however, both Congress and the executive branch in recent years have
mandated detention in certain specific asylum contexts.
One such context is "expedited removal," a special accelerated procedure
applicable to certain noncitizens upon their arrival in the United States (or, in
some limited instances, even in the interior)." 5 When expedited removal
applies, detention is mandated until an asylum seeker passes "a final
determination of credible fear of persecution."" 
6
A second context relates to Haitian boat people who arrive on U.S. shores
and apply for asylum. In In re D-J-,1 7 the Attorney General ruled that for
national security reasons all Haitians who arrive in the United States by boat
must be detained throughout their removal proceedings. 1 8 He reasoned that the
release of Haitians, even on bond, would encourage other Haitians to attempt
the voyage and that the Coast Guard would then have to interdict more vessels,
thus diverting resources that could be devoted to countering terrorism. 19
A third, also recent but short-lived, asylum detention program similarly
invoked national security. This one, announced by Homeland Security
the [USA PATRIOT Act] certification provision had yet to be invoked"); Margaret H. Taylor,
Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOYOLA L.
REv. 149, 149-50 (2004) (stating that the PATRIOT Act provision "was not used in the post-
9/11 detention effort" and that authorities instead have "relied on the detention authority in the
existing immigration statute"); see also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1003-08 (2002) (describing the government's
campaigns against noncitizens as one "in which the government has aggressively used
immigration authority to implement a broad strategy of preventive detention").
114. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (recognizing the right of foreign
nationals detained abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to seek habeas corpus).
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2000) (authorizing expedited removal).
116. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
117. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (2003).
118. See id. at 579 ("I conclude that releasing respondent, or similarly situated
undocumented seagoing migrants, on bond would give rise to adverse consequences for national
security and sound immigration policy.").
119. See id. (stating that the release of the respondent, a Haitian, "would come to the
attention of others in Haiti and encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea," and that
"surges in such illegal migration by sea injure national security by diverting valuable Coast
Guard and DOD resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities").
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Secretary Tom Ridge in March 2003, was dubbed "Operation Liberty Shield."
It listed 34 countries thought to harbor terrorists and required that any national
of a listed country be detained if he or she applied for asylum at a U.S. port of
entry and lacked proper entry documents. 120 Amidst a loud uproar, the policy
was quietly shelved after one month. 1
21
The large-scale detention of asylum seekers is especially striking in light
of generally prevailing international norms. It is widely recognized that asylum
seekers not only frequently, but typically, arrive without entry documents; even
if receiving countries were commonly willing to grant refugees advance
permission to resettle, the chaos and urgency of the refugees' departures seldom
permit advance applications. 22  For that and other reasons, the sorts of
categorical asylum detention practices catalogued in this section-and
particularly those that apply selectively to Haitians or to nationals of other
selected countries-are most likely incompatible with U.S. treaty obligations.1
23
2. Plea-Bargaining
Criminal-style plea bargaining has seeped into at least two areas of
immigration law. One of them stems from a series of steps taken by Congress
to admit to the United States, at least for temporary stays, certain noncitizens
likely to cooperate with the government in the criminal prosecutions of others.
120. See DHS to Detain Asylum Seekers Under "Operation Liberty Shield," REFUGEE
REPORTS (U.S. Comm. for Refugees and Immigrants, Washington D.C.), Mar./Apr. 2003, at 5-6
(describing "Operation Liberty Shield" and the earlier policy regarding asylum seekers).
121. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 50-51 (2003) (recounting the announcement and
subsequent termination of "Operation Liberty Shield").
122. See, e.g., Tanya Weinberg, Asylum Seekers Face U.S. Charges: Prosecutors Say
Dozens Entered Country Illegally, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 16,2003, at B I (noting
that refugees frequently flee without sufficient time to obtain proper documentation).
123. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Revised
Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention ofAsylum-Seekers,
1-3 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.unchr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3bdO36a74.pdf
(arguing that asylum-seekers should be detained only when it is necessary and stating that "the
use of detention is, in many instances, contrary to the norms and principles of international
law"); Letter from Guenet Guebre-Christos, Regional Representative, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], to Rebecca Sharpless, Attorney, Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center (Apr. 15, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 620 app. at 630-51
("In cases in which asylum seekers arrive with false or no documents, detention is justified only
when there is an intention to mislead or a refusal to cooperate with the authorities."); Michele R.
Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Proposalfor Ending the Unnecessary Detention
of Asylum-Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 237 (1999) (noting that treaty obligations
require protection to "genuine asylum seekers").
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Beginning in 1994,124 Congress enacted such provisions to encourage
assistance in the prosecution of criminal and terrorist organizations, human
traffickers, and domestic abusers. 125 As Nora Demleitner has observed, these
provisions have given rise to a kind of plea bargaining. Police and prosecutors
grant permission to remain at least temporarily in the United States rather than
initiate removal proceedings, in exchange for the willingness of a minor player
to cooperate in securing the convictions of those who played more major
roles. 126
Asylum is the other area of immigration law that has recently begun to
import criminal-style plea bargaining. To receive asylum, one must meet the
definition of "refugee" and receive the favorable exercise of discretion. 127 If
asylum is granted, the person may eventually adjust to permanent resident
status, 128 and his or her family members may be admitted as well. 129 A lesser,
non-discretionary remedy known as "withholding of removal" protects the
person against removal to the country of persecution but makes no provision for
admitting either the applicant or his or her family members to the United
States. 3 0
Practitioners now report a growing practice among some immigration
judges to offer applicants withholding of removal in exchange for withdrawing
their applications for asylum. Those kinds of plea-bargaining offers can cause
anguish. By accepting the offer, the applicant avoids being returned to his or
her persecutors but does not receive permission to remain in the United States
or to reunite with his or her spouse or minor children. If the applicant declines
the offer, he or she runs the risk of receiving no protection at all and being
returned to the country of persecution.
124. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 130003(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2024 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000)) (establishing a new
classification for individuals with information related to a criminal investigation or law
enforcement activities).
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 01 (a)(1 5)(S)-(U) (2000) (describing certain classes ofnonimmigrants).
126. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 1078-83 (describing the various methods through
which law enforcement can promise permission to stay in the United States in exchange for
cooperation). She proceeds to identify some of the unintended adverse consequences of these
and related discretionary inducements. Id. at 1084-93.
127. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b) (2000) (defining the term "refugee" and
describing the required conditions for granting asylum).
128. See id. § 1159 (2000) (describing the requirements and procedures for the adjustment
of status from refugee to immigrant).
129. See id. § 1158(b)(3) (2000) (describing the treatment of spouse and children of a
person who is granted asylum).
130. See id. § 1231 (b)(3) (2000) (restricting the removal of a noncitizen to a country where
his or her life or freedom would be threatened).
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E. Using the Same Players
Increasingly, many of the government personnel who implement the
criminal justice system are simultaneously charged with enforcing the nation's
system of immigration control. This section offers two examples-state or
local enforcement officials and sentencing judges in criminal cases.
1. State and Local Criminal Enforcement Officials
Historically, while the federal government has long recognized the
authority of state police to arrest individuals for federal crimes, state officials
were assumed to have no "inherent" authority to arrest individuals solely on
suspicion of civil immigration violations.' 31 That position, confirmed by the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel in a formal memorandum as
recently as 1996,132 has now changed. Shortly after the issuance of the 1996
memorandum, Congress enacted IIRIRA, three provisions of which specifically
encouraged the use of state and local criminal enforcement machinery to bolster
the INS civil immigration enforcement efforts. One provision authorized the
Attorney General to enter into collaborative agreements with state and local law
enforcement agencies; the state and local police would investigate, apprehend,
and detain noncitizens suspected of being deportable, and the federal
government would provide the necessary training.133  Another provision
authorized the Attorney General to dispense with the training in the case of a
"mass influx" that "presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate
Federal response."1 34 Still another provision prohibited states from restricting
131. See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 664 (noting that
until recently state law enforcement officials lacked authority to arrest or detain noncitizens
solely for the purposes of civil immigration proceedings); Miller, Citizenship and Severity,
supra note 1, at 637-38 (noting that state and local law enforcement officers were authorized to
enforce the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act).
132. See Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra note 1, at 638 (noting that a formal
Department of Justice memorandum in 1996 concluded that "[s]tate police lack recognized legal
authority to arrest or detain aliens solely for purposes of civil immigration proceedings as
opposed to criminal prosecution").
133. See IIRIRA § 133; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (describing how state officers and employees
can perform immigration officer functions).
134. See id. § 372(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (allowing the Attorney General to authorize
state and local law enforcement officers to exercise immigration powers in case of circumstances
requiring an immediate federal response).
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the exchange of information with the INS about an individual's immigration
status.
135
Since 1996, that trend has gathered steam. In 2002, the Attorney General,
renouncing the 1996 Justice Department memorandum, concluded that state
and local criminal enforcement officials have the inherent authority to arrest
those individuals whom they believe to be deportable; no affirmative federal
authorization is necessary.136 The immigration reform bill passed in 2005 by
the House of Representatives would have gone further. While Attorney
General Ashcroft's proclamation of inherent state and local authority spoke
only to the power to arrest deportable noncitizens, the House bill would have
recognized an inherent authority of state and local law enforcement officers to
"investigate, identify, apprehend, arrest, detain, or transfer to Federal custody"
any noncitizens they encounter "in the course of carrying out routine duties."
1 37
The same bill would have authorized DHS to develop training manuals
and courses for state and local police engaged in immigration apprehensions
138
but cautioned that nothing in the bill itself "or any other provision of law" was
to be construed as making such training a prerequisite to state or local
immigration enforcement assistance in the normal course of the officers'
duties.' 39 The bill would also have authorized grants to state and local law
enforcement agencies that assist in immigration enforcement 140 and would have
cut off federal funds to any state or political subdivision that prohibits law
enforcement agencies from cooperating with federal immigration officials.'
4
1
135. See id. § 642; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000) (prohibiting state governments from
restricting information from any government official or entity to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service regarding the immigration status of any individual).
136. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179, 181-82 (2005) (describing
Attorney General Ashcroft's conclusion that states have the inherent authority to arrest
noncitizens who are suspected of being deportable).
137. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 220 (1st Sess. 2005).
138. See id. § 221(a) (requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a training
manual and a pocket guide for state or local law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
immigration enforcement).
139. See id. § 221(e)(3) ("Nothing in this Act or any other provision of law shall be
construed as making any immigration-related training a requirement for, or prerequisite to, any
State or local law enforcement officer to assist in the enforcement of Federal immigration
laws.").
140. See id. § 222 ("[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall make grants to States and
political subdivisions of States for procurement of equipment, technology, facilities, and other
products that facilitate and are directly related to investigating, apprehending, arresting,
detaining, or transporting immigration law violators.").
141. See id. § 225(a) ("[A] State (or political subdivision of a State) that... prohibits law
enforcement officers of the State, or of a political subdivision ... ,from assisting or cooperating
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The constitutional and policy arguments for and against enlisting state and
local police to help enforce the immigration laws are thoughtfully expressed in
other writings. 42 The point here is simply to highlight one example of the
trend toward using the same players to enforce the criminal laws and the civil
deportation laws.
2. Federal Sentencing Judges
One other set of actors in the criminal justice system has been enlisted into
the immigration enforcement cause-federal sentencing judges. At one time,
sentencing judges in both federal and state criminal cases had the discretion to
issue binding "judicial recommendations against deportation" (JRADs) in
certain criminal cases.1 43 The Immigration Act of 1990 repealed JRADs.'44
Today, therefore, sentencing judges have no power to prohibit deportation.
In 1994, however, Congress gave federal judges the power to order
deportation during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, provided the
particular crime fit within certain of the crime-related deportation grounds. 145
In 1996, Congress extended this power to all cases in which the crime fit within
any of the crime-related deportation grounds. 146  As would be true in a
traditional administrative deportation or removal proceeding, the judge holds a
mini-hearing to decide whether the person fits within the charged deportation
ground and, if so, whether the defendant is eligible for, and deserving of, any
form of statutory discretionary relief.'47 The power to decide the deportation
with Federal immigration law enforcement... shall not receive any of the funds that would
otherwise be allocated to the State under Section 241 (i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.").
142. Compare Kobach, supra note 136 (arguing in favor, former chief advisor to former
Attorney General Ashcroft), with Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at
663-69 (arguing against). For some thoughtful parallels to federal-state cooperation in drug
enforcement, see generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of
American Criminal Law, 46 HAsTINGs L.J. 1135(1995).
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(2) (1990) (allowing a federal districtjudge to recommend that
a particular criminal conviction not be the basis for deportation).
144. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 125 1(b) by removing the provisions that had given federal judges the ability to recommend
against deportation).
145. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322-24 (Oct. 25, 1994) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) by
inserting a provision giving federal judges the power to order deportation).
146. IIRIRA § 374; 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c).
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C) (2000) (requiring the Commissioner to provide to a
court a report regarding the noncitizen's eligibility for relief from deportation if the noncitizen
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issue exists only if the prosecutor, with the consent of DHS, requests the
sentencing judge to exercise this jurisdiction; upon such a request, the
sentencing judge then has the discretion to do so.
148
If the sentencing judge agrees to decide the removal question, either the
defendant or DHS has the right to appeal the judge's ultimate decision to the
court of appeals. 149 If the sentencing judge decides against ordering removal
(either because the judge opts out of the decision entirely or because, on the
merits, the judge finds the person either not deportable or eligible for and
deserving of statutory discretionary relief), DHS gets a second shot; it may
initiate removal proceedings again via the conventional administrative
process. 150 There is no analogous provision giving the defendant a second shot
in conventional removal proceedings.
The enforcement priorities that animate these arrangements will be evident
from the asymmetry. Federal sentencing judges have been given ample power
to order removal but, with the abolition of JRADs, now have almost no power
to prevent it. Further, only the prosecutor and DHS may request the sentencing
judge to decide the deportation issue; the defendant may not. And once the
sentencing judge (or the court of appeals if there is an appeal) has decided the
issue, the government, if dissatisfied with the result, may obtain a de novo
redetermination in conventional administrative proceedings; the noncitizen may
not.
As the Introduction suggested, this Article will bemoan the heavy use of
the criminal enforcement model in immigration law without the corresponding
criminal adjudication model and its strong procedural protections. At first
glance the present Part might appear to provide a counter-example, because the
criminal justice agent that has been brought into the immigration process is a
federal court of general jurisdiction. While the forum is borrowed from the
criminal adjudication system, however, the procedure is not. The mini-hearing
conducted by the sentencing judge before deciding whether to order deportation
bears little resemblance to the broad safeguards required in criminal
proceedings. There is no provision for a full judicial trial, no requirement of
has provided sufficient evidence to establish prima facie eligibility for such relief).
148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1) (2000) (describing the authority of a district court to enter a
judicial order of removal as discretionary).
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(3)(A) (2000) ("A judicial order of removal may be appealed
by either party to the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court is located.").
150. See id. § 1228(c)(4) (2000) ("Denial of a request for judicial order of removal shall
not preclude the Attorney General from initiating removal proceedings pursuant to section
122 9a of this title upon the same ground of deportability or upon any other ground of
deportability under section 1227(a) of this title.").
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proof beyond reasonable doubt, no provision for appointed counsel for indigent
defendants, no bar on hearsay evidence, and, as noted earlier in connection with
the government's right to request a redetermination before the administrative
tribunals, no prohibition on double jeopardy.
1 5 1
III. Immigrants and Criminals in the Public Mind
Part I demonstrated the creeping influence of the criminal enforcement
model in immigration law. Policymakers presumably act on the basis of both
their own perceptions of reality and their perceptions of other people's
perceptions. The relevant others, in turn, presumably include both the public
generally and specific constituencies. It is useful, therefore, to consider what
mental associations might be driving the incorporation of the criminal
enforcement model into immigration law.
Much of the recent immigration enforcement-related activity at the federal,
state, and local levels reflects someone's perceived associations of immigrants
with criminals. Whether policymakers harbor this perception themselves or
perceive merely that their constituents do so is not clear and at any rate most
likely varies from one policymaker to another. For present purposes it does not
matter. The key point, I argue, is that, at some level, perceptions of immigrants
as criminals appear to influence both the tone of the public debate and the
outcomes.
What accounts for these perceptions? The most obvious answer would be
reality, if there were a demonstrated positive correlation between immigrants
and crime. Illegal immigration, of course, can itself be a criminal offense. As
elaborated more fully in Part II.A above, entry without inspection is a federal
crime. 52 A bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2005 would have
made overstaying a lawfully issued visa or other unlawful presence a criminal
offense as well. 53  But those laws establish an association of illegal
immigration with crime only by definitional fiat. At any rate, they tell us
nothing about whether legal immigration correlates with crime. For policy
purposes, the real issue is whether either immigrants generally or
151. See id. § 1228(c)(2) (2000) (laying out the procedure for judicial removal).
152. See id. §§ 1325(a), 1326 (2000) (describing penalties for noncitizens who enter the
United States improperly or re-enter the United States after being removed).
153. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 203(5) (1st Sess. 2005) (as passed by the House, Dec.
16, 2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1325 by prescribing criminal penalties for any noncitizen "in
the United States in violation of the immigration laws or the regulations prescribed
thereunder").
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undocumented immigrants in particular are disproportionately prone to
independent criminal behavior.
There is no shortage of demographic reasons for hypothesizing a positive
correlation between immigration and crime. As others have pointed out, the
immigrant population as a whole is younger, more male, and less educated than
the average native-born American; all these characteristics correlate positively
with crime rates. 54  In addition, immigrants face greater problems of
acculturation and assimilation than the native-born, and economic realities
force disproportionate numbers of immigrants to settle in poor, ethnically
heterogeneous neighborhoods heavily populated by young males.'55
These crime predictors notwithstanding, it is clear that immigrants' crime
rates have consistently been dramatically lower than those of their otherwise
demographically similar native-born counterparts. One leading study focuses
on males aged 18-39, the age/gender cohort with the highest crime rates. It
finds that, within this cohort, the native-born are four times more likely than
immigrants to be incarcerated in federal or state prisons or local jails. 56 The
lower-than-average incarceration rates for these young male immigrants hold
true for every ethnic group, without exception.
157
154. See Ramiro Martinez & Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, 1 CRIM. JUSTICE
485,485-86, 495 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/crininaljustice2000/vol1/02j.pdf
(reviewing the reasons why researchers might hypothesize immigrant populations to be more
crime-prone than native populations); Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of
Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men,
Migration Information Source at 4 (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.migration
information.org/Feature/display.cfrn?id=403 (noting that the current era of mass immigration
has coincided with an era of mass imprisonment and examining empirically the role of ethnicity,
national origin, and generation in relation to crime and imprisonment) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
155. See Martinez & Lee, supra note 154, at 485-86 (finding that despite the reasons to
expect immigrant populations to be more crime-prone, most empirical studies find the opposite).
156. That study was based on data drawn from the 2000 U.S. Census. In that year, 3.51%
of all native-born males aged 18-39 were incarcerated; the corresponding figure for immigrants
was 0.86%. Rumbaut et al., supra note 154, at 4-5 & tbl. 1. For various reasons, the differential
cannot be attributed to deportations. Id. at 9. Generally, the immigrant percentage of the
federal prison population is much higher than the immigrant percentage of the state prison
population. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offender
Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (under heading "Comparing
Federal and State prison inmates") (stating that 18% of federal inmates were non-citizens as
opposed to 5% of state inmates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a
more detailed look at immigrant incarceration rates, see Rubdn G. Rumbaut et al., Immigration
and Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of Imprisonment Among First- and Second-
Generation Young Adults, in IMMIGRATION AND CRIME-RACE, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENCE
(Ramiro Martinez & Abel Valenzuela eds., 2006).
157. Rumbaut et al., supra note 154, at 5.
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Still, one might legitimately say, the policy-relevant question is not how
immigrants' criminal propensities compare to those of demographically similar
native-born Americans, but rather how they compare to those of the native-born
population as a whole. If immigrants were more prone to crime than the native-
born, it would be of small consolation that the differential can be linked to age
and gender. Whatever the demographic explanation, some might ask, why add
a disproportionately criminal element to our population?
Remarkably, however, immigrants commit fewer crimes per capita than
the native-born even without controlling for age, gender, educational
attainment, and other relevant demographics.158  Two researchers, after
meticulously analyzing voluminous historical and contemporary studies and
noting the factors that might have predicted a higher than average crime rate
among immigrants, conclude: "Yet, the major finding of a century of research
on immigration and crime is that immigrants..., contrary to public opinion,
nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than native groups."' 159 I must
acknowledge, however, that I have been unable to find any studies that tell us
whether the same is true of undocumented immigrants. On that issue, all that
can be reliably said is that there is no clear evidence either way.
Given the consistent evidence that immigrants are more law-abiding than
the native-born, and the absence of evidence that even undocumented
immigrants are any more or less prone to crime than the native-born, the
questions remain: Do either the general public or policymakers have contrary
perceptions? And if so, why? This Part demonstrates that the public does
indeed associate immigration with crime, and it speculates on what is driving
those perceptions. I suggest there are widespread, perhaps unconscious,
assumptions that connect at least four phenomena-immigration generally,
illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism. 60 The obvious additional factor of
158. See Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Cross-City Evidence on the
Relationship Between Immigration and Crime, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 457, 483-84
(1998) ("The analysis of the NLSY clearly implies that immigrants are less likely to commit
crimes than natives."). This empirical study found there was no correlation between changes in
the immigrant percentages of the populations of several major cities over time and changes in
those same cities' crime rates. Id. at 469-80. The authors also analyzed individualized data that
confirmed other studies' findings of a lower crime rate among immigrants than among the native
bom. Id. at 483-84. Accord Martinez & Lee, supra note 154, at 496 (concluding that
immigrants committed fewer crimes per capita than the native born).
159. Martinez & Lee, supra note 154, at 496.
160. Others have made thoughtful comments on some of these relationships. See
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1 (discussing immigration and the
justice system after September 11); Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 1 (discussing
the criminalization of immigration activities by legal immigrants).
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anti-immigrant racial stereotyping is the subject of a rich literature that this
Article will not attempt to amplify.'
61
All of these perceptions, of course, reflect the ways in which the human
mind processes information and forms impressions. Psychologist Scott Plous
identifies a number of factors that influence the degree to which a given piece
of evidence will shape one's perceptions of patterns. Among the critical
factors, he says, are the "availability" of evidence, its "vividness," and its
"salience."'' 62  When media accounts and other forms of public discourse
highlight illegal immigration or immigrant involvement in terrorism or other
crime; when the images of these activities are made vivid; and when people
view these activities as increasingly salient to their daily lives, the assumptions
and decisions that are described in the paragraphs below seem unsurprising.
A. Linking Legal Immigration and Illegal Immigration
The first set of linked perceptions to consider is that between legal and
illegal immigration. Here there are several sub-links. Although the vast bulk
of immigration to the United States occurs through legal channels, 163 the public
161. See generally IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (presenting essays that discuss
American nativism and immigration); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-
September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2004) (exploring
post-September 11 racial hate crimes against Arab, Muslim, and South Asian minorities); Susan
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Scheherezade Meets Kajka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of
Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 51 (1999) (discussing the use of secret evidence in
deportation proceedings against Arabs and Muslims); Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S.
Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform after "9/11 "?, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315 (2003)
(discussing the structural problems in U.S. immigration law); Berta Esperanza Hermindez-
Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First
Century, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1075 (1996) (suggesting a human rights model to redress
discrimination against noncitizens); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111
(1998) (exploring a psychological model to explain hostility towards immigrants); Victor C.
Romero, "Aren 'tyou Latino?"Building Bridges upon Common Misperceptions, 33 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 837 (2000) (discussing how minorities can use common misperceptions to strengthen
their community); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness,"
and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997) (exploring the pervasive
presumption that Asian Americans are foreigners).
162. SCOTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121-30, 178-
80 (1993). I am indebted to Rebecca Hollander-Blumofffor introducing me to these concepts.
163. The most widely cited study of the undocumented population is JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
PEW HISPANIC CENTER, ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED
POPULATION (2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf. Passel estimates that
undocumented immigrants constitute approximately 20-30% of the total number of foreign-
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007)
thinks the opposite is true. 164 Whether or not that misconception fuels the
public preoccupation with illegal immigration, there can be no doubt that in the
past twenty years it is the latter which has attracted the bulk of the public's
attention. At the federal level, four of the last five 165 major congressional
immigration reform efforts have focused on illegal immigration. The
Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) had two major components-
legalization of most of the then existing undocumented immigrants and
employer sanctions to deter future illegal immigration. 166  The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), as its
name implies, similarly targeted illegal immigration in myriad ways. 167 The
REAL ID Act of 2005 dramatically increased the use of state bureaucracies-
particularly Departments of Motor Vehicles-to deter illegal immigration.16
8
The subject of illegal immigration similarly dominated the immigration reform
bills passed by both houses of Congress in 2005 and 2006, particularly the
House of Representatives version. 1
69
born residents of the United States. Id. at 3. On that assumption, lawfully present immigrants
outnumber the undocumented by much more than two to one. The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, estimates that as of January 2005 there
were 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States out of a total foreign
born population of 27.3 million. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES:
JANUARY 2005, at 6 (2006), http://dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL PE
2005.pdf. The latter figure is surely too low, since the foreign born population had already
reached 31.1 million by 2000 and has been increasing steadily. MARC J. PERRY & JASON P.
SHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION OF NATIvES AND THE FOREIGN BORN: 1995 TO
2000, at 1(2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr- 11.pdf. But even the relatively
high ratio reported by DHS would leave the number of lawfully present immigrants greatly in
excess of the number of undocumented immigrants. The undocumented proportion of the total
foreign-born population has, however, been on the rise. MICHAEL F. FiX ET AL., THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (2001),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_ integration.pdf.
164. See, e.g., Butcher & Piehl, supra note 158, at 458 n.1 (stating that the public thinks
most immigrants come illegally).
165. The lone exception was the Immigration Act of 1990, which liberalized the admission
of employment-based immigrants and narrowed some of the older exclusion grounds.
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
166. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(controlling illegal immigration).
167. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (reforming multiple aspects of immigration).
168. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Stat. 231 (providing guidelines to
strengthen national security).
169. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th
Cong. (2006).
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The federal preoccupation with illegal immigration has also driven U.S.
asylum policy.170 Asylum policymakers admittedly must consider not only the
humanitarian and human rights objectives of U.S. asylum policy but also the
prevention of asylum fraud. The problem is that the obsession with deterring
asylum fraud has blocked out all competing policy objectives.171 Virtually all
the recent changes to U.S. asylum law have elevated the prevention of abuse
above both the compassionate relief of suffering and the promotion of
international human rights.
72
By way of example, Congress has made it easier for those who adjudicate
asylum cases to deny claims on credibility grounds.173 Like its European
counterparts, Congress and the executive branch have also made it steadily
harder to gain access to the U.S. asylum determination system. These measures
have included filing deadlines, safe third country limitations, an accelerated
procedure known as "expedited removal," pre-inspection procedures at foreign
airports, interdiction of vessels on the High Seas, and a series of deterrents to
seeking asylum--detention, denial of work authorization, criminal prosecution,
and penalties on both applicants and their attorneys for filing asylum
applications later adjudged to be frivolous.1
7 4
Perhaps most striking, however, has been the zeal with which state and
local governments have plunged into this previously federal domain. The
increased use of state and local law enforcement officials and agencies to
apprehend, arrest, and detain individuals suspected of being unlawfully present
has already been noted. 1
75
Beyond that, state and local governments have taken a wide range of
measures designed to discourage undocumented immigrants from coming and
to encourage those already residing there to leave. Some of those measures
parallel federal statutory directives but go well beyond what those federal laws
require the states and municipalities to do. Federal law prohibits the knowing
170. See HemAndez-Truyol, supra note 161, at 1085-86 (criticizing U.S. refugee policy for
inadequate attention to human rights).
171. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 161, at 324, 327-30 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (describing the narrowing of
immigrants' rights).
172. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 161, at 254,261-62 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (arguing that U.S.
immigration laws ignore human rights norms).
173. See Real ID Act § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 303 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 58(b)(1)(B)(iii)) (setting credibility standards for asylum cases).
174. These strategies are discussed more fully in LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 1095-1135.
175. See supra Part II.E. 1 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction between state
and federal authorities in immigration enforcement).
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employment of unauthorized workers, 76 for example, but no federal law
requires states to impose additional penalties on violators. Yet they have done
so, as explained below. A federal law due to go into effect in 2008 will
prohibit states from giving undocumented immigrants any drivers' licenses that
could be used for federal identification purposes, but that law specifically
allows states to issue special drivers' licenses so long as they are conspicuously
marked as invalid for federal identification. 77 Federal law permits states to
make undocumented immigrants eligible for welfare benefits that the 1996
federal welfare reform law does not provide, as long as the state passes the
necessary legislation after the 1996 enactment date. 78  Federal law also
arguably bars states from classifying undocumented students as in-state
residents for purposes of tuition rates at postsecondary institutions, 79 but
leading scholars have maintained that the relevant provision is ambiguous at
best; nonetheless, the vast majority of states require their undocumented
residents to pay the higher out-of-state tuition.
180
Other recent state and local actions have taken their anti-illegal
immigration campaigns into uncharted territory. 181 Texas (early on) and
California (more recently) both attempted to bar undocumented children who
lived in their states from attending public elementary and secondary schools.
Both laws were promptly held unconstitutional. 182 The City of Hazleton,
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(2000).
177. See REAL ID Act, §§ 201(3), 202(a)(1), 202(c)(2)(B), 202(d)(1 1)(A), 119 Stat. at
312-15 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2000)) (restricting state-issued
identification cards).
178. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, §§ 401(a), 411, 110 Stat. 2105,2113,2148 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601,611
(2000)) (presenting guidelines for state welfare programs).
179. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 505, 110 Stat. 3009-672, (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1623 (2000)) (limiting undocumented immigrants' eligibility for higher education benefits).
180. See Michael A. Olivas, A Rebuttal to FAIR: States Can Enact Residency Statutes for
the Undocumented, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL. 652-53 (2002) (suggesting that states may grant
in-state tuition status for undocumented students); Thomas R. Ruge & Angela D. Iza, Higher
Education for Undocumented Students: The Case for Open Admission and In-State Tuition
Rates for Students Without Lawful Immigration Status, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 257,
266-67 (2005) ("[Undocumented immigrants] must pay the out-of-state tuition rates that are
often three (or more) times the in-state tuition rates.").
181. For a summary of immigration-related state legislative activity in 2006, see National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation Related to Immigration: Enacted,
Vetoed, and Pending Gubernatorial Action (July 3,2006), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/
06ImmigEnactedLegis2.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
182. The Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982), struck down the
Texas law on equal protection grounds. A federal district court enjoined enforcement of the
California law, Proposition 187, on grounds of federal preemption. See League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("No matter how
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Pennsylvania drew more recent national attention in July 2006.183 It passed an
ordinance that prohibits the issuance or renewal of a business permit to any
entity that "utilize[s] the services or hire[s] any person who is an unlawful
worker."' I8 4 Another ordinance requires proof of citizenship for every rental
occupant. 85 The Hazelton ordinances have spawned a number of similar
ordinances nationwide; mass evictions have begun.1
8 6
B. Linking Immigration and Crime
Despite clear evidence' 8 7 that immigrants are generally less likely than the
native-born to engage in criminal behavior, public opinion polls historically,
and today, reveal precisely the opposite perceptions. In poll after poll, the




Statements by public figures, especially politicians, often reinforce this
perception. 189
serious the problem may be,.., the authority to regulate immigration belongs exclusively to the
federal government ... ").
183. See Hazelton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12,2006)
[hereinafter Hazelton Illegal Immigration Act] (denying business permits and contracts to
business entities that hire undocumented immigrants and prohibiting the "harboring" of
undocumented immigrants); see also Hazelton, Pa., Official English Ordinance 2006-19 (Sept.
12, 2006) (declaring English to be the official language in Hazelton); Hazelton, Pa., Landlord
Tenant Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Hazelton Landlord Tenant Act]
(establishing a registration program for residential rental property to ensure legal residence).
184. See Hazelton Illegal Immigration Act, supra note 183, at § 4 (laying out the business
permit, contract and grant restrictions dealing with illegal immigrants).
185. See Hazelton Landlord Tenant Act, supra note 183, at § 7 (laying out the
requirements for any rental tenant).
186. See, e.g., Gaiutra Bahadur, Riverside Bolsters Its Ban on Illegal Immigrants, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2006, at BO1 (describing the effects of one city's new illegal immigration
ordinance); Ellen Barry, It's 'Get These People Out of Town ': As More Communities Consider
Measures Aimed at Expelling Illegal Immigrants, One Group Files Suit in Hopes of Stopping
Such Laws, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at Al (noting that cities are enacting undocumented
immigrant statutes).
187. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (citing evidence that immigrants do
not commit more crimes than U.S. citizens).
188. See Butcher& Piehl, supra note 158, at 458 (citing a 1993 poll in which 59% of the
respondents associated recent immigrants with crime); see also Martinez & Lee, supra note 154,
at 502-03 (citing a long list of public expressions); see also Rumbaut et al., supra note 154, at 3
(citing a 2000 poll in which 73% of the respondents associated immigration with crime).
189. See Butcher & Piehl, supra note 158, at 458 (citing examples of statements by public
figures that reinforce the misconception).
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Public statements that purport to associate illegal immigration with crime
have also become common. It is not unusual for state and local laws aimed at
reducing illegal immigration to contain language that "finds" a causal
connection between illegal immigration and crime. In 1994, that language
appeared in Section 1 of California Proposition 187: "The People of California
find and declare... [t]hat they have suffered and are suffering personal injury
and damage caused by the criminal conduct of criminal aliens in this state."'190
The Hazleton, Pennsylvania ordinance similarly says, "The People of the City
of Hazleton find and declare ... [that] [i]llegal immigration leads to higher
crime rates . ,,19' Again, the statements of public officials, including
President Bush, have reinforced this impression. 192 These preambles and
speeches cite no evidence to support their "findings." Nor, as observed earlier,
have I been able to unearth any such evidence. If the public associates
immigration primarily with illegal immigration, and if it believes that the latter
leads to higher crime rates, then it is not surprising that the public would
associate immigration generally with crime.
C. Linking Immigration and Terrorism
Parallel to the web of perceived relationships between immigration and
ordinary garden-variety crime are the perceived links between immigration and
terrorism. The preceding subsection suggested that the public appears to link
immigration with crime both directly and indirectly-i.e., by associating
immigration generally with crime and by associating immigration generally
with illegal immigration and then linking the latter to crime. Analogous
perceptions have taken root with respect to immigration and terrorism.
For perceptions of direct links between immigration and terrorism, one
need go no further than the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in 2002.193 This Department sprang from the ashes of September 11.
The Homeland Security Act dissolved the Justice Department's Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) and redistributed almost all its functions
190. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,787-91 (App.
A) (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing the text of Proposition 187).
191. Hazelton Illegal Immigration Act, supra note 183, at § 2.
192. See Rumbaut et al., supra note 154, at 3 (noting that in a national address on May 15,
2006, President Bush declared that "[i]llegal immigration... brings crime to our
communities").
193. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(establishing the Department of Homeland Security and laying out the department's functions).
THE NEW PATH OF IMMIGRATION LA W
among several new agencies set up within DHS. 194  Perhaps no single
development better exemplifies the public association of immigration and
terrorism than the transfer of immigration functions to a Department whose
defining mission is counter-terrorism. This perceived link is a two-way street.
The transfer both reflects and reinforces the public perception that immigration
and terrorism are joined at the hip. Moreover, since the Secretary of DHS
knows that the Department will be judged first and foremost by its success in
fighting terrorism, it would be unnatural to expect its highest priorities to be
anything else. The inevitable result is that its immigration work will emphasize
enforcement over any competing goals, as elaborated more fully in Part V
below.
Apart from re-organizing the bureaucracy, Congress and the executive
branch have aimed the vast bulk of their substantive counter-terrorism
initiatives at non-citizens generally and immigration in particular. The
Homeland Security Act was but one of Congress's direct responses to the
September 11 attacks; other anti-terrorism statutes laden with immigration-
related provisions included the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,'95 the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,196 the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,197 and the REAL ID Act of 2005.198
These and other congressional and executive branch actions attacked what they
perceived as security vulnerabilities in the immigration laws. They did this
through a combination of programs that involved detention, intelligence-
gathering, expansion of the substantive grounds for removing noncitizens,
narrowing the procedural safeguards in immigration proceedings, visa and other
overseas policies, border fortification, and controversial profiling practices.1 99
All these initiatives reflect perceptions that immigration reform represents the
surest path to national security.
194. See id. § 47 1(a) (abolishing the INS); see also id § 462 (noting that the only major
exception was that the former INS responsibility for unaccompanied noncitizen children was
transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human
Services).
195. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (enacting
legislation to deter and punish terrorist acts, and to enhance law enforcement investigatory
tools).
196. See Enhancing Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173,
116 Stat. 543 (enhancing U.S. border security).
197. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (reforming the intelligence community).
198. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005)
(prescribing identification document security standards and credibility standards for asylum
proceedings).
199. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 52, at 843-914 (laying out the details of the programs).
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Mark Krikorian, the executive director of America's most powerful anti-
immigration lobbying and research organization, the Center for Immigration
Studies, makes explicit his view that immigration control is "central" to U.S.
counter-terrorism efforts:
The reason is elementary: no matter the weapon or delivery systen-
hijacked airliners, shipping containers, suitcase nukes, anthrax spores-
operatives are required to carry out the attacks. Those operatives have to
enter and work in the United States .... Thus keeping the terrorists out or
apprehending them after they get in is indispensable to victory.
200
He adds, "[s]ince the terrorists are themselves the weapons, immigration control
is to asymmetric warfare what missile defense is to strategic warfare.,
20 1
As with the earlier discussion of immigration and ordinary crime, there are
also indirect perceived links between immigration and terrorism. These entail
associating legal immigration with illegal immigration and then associating the
latter with terrorism. An example of the focus on illegal immigration as a
priority in fighting terrorism is the same piece by Krikorian. He argues that
combating illegal immigration would go a long way toward reducing the threat
of terrorism.
2°2
It is hard for immigrant advocates to win. Some critics of immigration
will invariably observe that most of the September 11 hijackers were in
perfectly lawful immigration status, the implication being that U.S. immigration
criteria are too lax. Others will observe that several had violated the
immigration laws, the implication being that the chief problem is
enforcement.2 °3 Together, those who complied with the immigration laws and
those who violated them comprise the universe of all noncitizens in the United
States. It seems, therefore, that any set of facts about the immigration status of
the September 11 perpetrators will be marshaled in an attempt to demonstrate
204that the real culprit is immigration.
200. Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out: Immigration Policy andAsymmetric Warfare,
THE NAT'L INTEREST 77, 78 (Spring 2004).
201. Id. at 80.
202. See id. (arguing that because of the difficulties in letting in "good" immigration
violators but keeping out the "bad" ones, across-the-board immigration enforcement will reduce
terrorism).
203. See id. at 83 ("Of the 48 A1-Qaeda operatives, nearly half were either illegal aliens at
the time of their crimes or had violated immigration laws at some point prior to their terrorist
acts."). However, Krikorian could as easily have observed that more than half had complied
with the immigration laws and that therefore the major problem lies in our legal immigration
rules.
204. I recognize that the two arguments are not necessarily in conflict. Some might believe
that the immigration laws are both too permissive and too loosely enforced. The point here is
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IV. Rejecting the Criminal Adjudication Model
The preceding Parts establish and seek to explain the steady incorporation
of the criminal enforcement model into modem immigration law. As this Part
shows, adjudication has been a different story. Here the civil regulatory model
has imbedded itself firmly. The discussion below will highlight the courts'
unwavering depiction of deportation as "civil" and not punitive.
Subpart A will describe the courts' embrace of the civil regulatory model
in immigration adjudication and evaluate the theory that underlies it. Subpart B
will then explore three different arenas in which these events have had concrete
consequences. In one arena, non-citizens in deportation proceedings have
asserted various constitutional safeguards that hinge on the classification of a
sanction as punishment. In a second setting, non-citizen criminal defendants
have sought to withdraw guilty pleas on the ground that they did not know the
pleas could lead to deportation. The third context, I argue, has been the erosion
of the decisional independence that adjudicators in deportation cases once
brought to their work.
A. Deportation is Not Punishment
If there has been any constant in U.S. immigration law, it is the insistence
of the courts that deportation is not punishment. From the Supreme Court's
1893 landmark decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States °5 through the
modem era, no court has ever deviated from this principle. 20 6 As discussed
simply that one cannot prove a link between immigration and terrorism just by observing that
each of the September 11 terrorists either did or did not violate the immigration laws.
205. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,730 (1893) (asserting that because
deportation was not criminal punishment, the due process challenge would "therefore" fail).
The word "therefore," whether or not accurate in 1893, would certainly be inapt today. A
consequence need not be "punishment" for due process limitations to apply. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (noting that due process requirements are not limited to
situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities).
206. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999) ("Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in
principle the alien is not being punished for that act... but is merely being held to the terms
under which he was admitted."); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)
(concluding that deportation is not punishment but rather is a refusal by the government to
harbor persons it does not want); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (refusing to break
from precedent regarding the theory of deportation); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591
(1913) ("A deportation proceeding is purely a civil action to determine eligibility to remain in
this country, not to punish unlawful entry."). But see Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 21 (N.D.
111. 1975) (holding that deportation can sometimes be punishment), rev'd, 529 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1976).
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below, a broad range of legal consequences have flowed from the characterization
of deportation as civil rather than punitive.
Are the courts right? Some exceptionally weak arguments have been made on
both sides of this debate. To conclude that deportation is not punishment, courts
have frequently proceeded formalistically, content simply to label deportation "civil"
or "not criminal. ,207 By this the courts presumably mean that Congress has assigned
the task of adjudicating deportation cases to civil authorities rather than to the
criminal justice system. But that rationale is circular. It does not help answer
whether deportation is sufficiently punitive in nature that Congress should have
made it part of the criminal justice process in the first place.
Similarly, stare decisis has played a large role in the proliferating uses of the
civil/criminal distinction to reject constitutional rights in deportation cases.2 °8 The
now prolific case law dismissing deportation as civil rather than criminal or
otherwise punitive is long on citation of precedent and short on independent
reasoning. 2°9 This snowballing effect is described elsewhere.210
To be fair, one argument frequently invoked to classify deportation as
punishment seems equally deficient. That argument rests solely on the potential
severity of the consequences and generally emphasizes the broken ties and all the
treasures that the deported individual leaves behind. The argument is typically
207. See Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. INS, 447 F.2d 603,606 (7th Cir. 1971) (concluding that
the petitioner's reliance on cases granting a right to appointed counsel was misplaced because
deportation is not a criminal proceeding); see also Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d 207,209
(9th Cir. 1969) (dismissing the petitioner's first assignment of error that he should have received
instructions that counsel would be provided at the government's expense if necessary, because a
deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution); Nason v. INS, 370 F.2d 865,868 (2d Cir.
1967) ("[A] deportation proceeding has uniformly been held to be civil and not criminal in
character.") (citations omitted); Ah Chiu Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1966)
(refusing to extend to deportation proceedings the same immunities accorded to defendants in
criminal cases). But cf Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 1975)
(DeMascio, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of the "civil"/ "criminal" distinction and concluding
that "deportation is punishment, plain and simple").
208. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 208 (1987) (noting that every court ruling on the question of whether
deportation is a form of punishment has held that it is not).
209. See id. ("As with other aspects of the plenary power doctrine, that conclusion has been
reached mechanically, with little reasoned analysis.").
210. See id. at 208-09 (citing cases and describing the effects of cases upholding
deportation as non-punitive).
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expressed with unusual eloquence, often by legendary national leaders211 or
judges.212
To be sure, the potential consequences of deportation are severe. They include
not only all the obvious traumas associated with forcible separation from family,
friends, and community, loss of property, and loss of a livelihood, but also a bar on
returning for at least ten years and sometimes forever;2 3 the loss of social security
benefits for which the deportee has paid and on which he or she might depend;
214
and the emotional and financial losses for U.S. citizens and other family members
who are left behind. But the severity of a consequence does not make it
punishment. Any number of devastating losses can result from any number of
occurrences--car accidents, ill health, even intentional homicide-without the
consequence being termed punishment.
The most compelling arguments for classifying deportation as punishment, in
my view, are either historical or functional. From ancient Rome to eighteenth and
nineteenth century Britain, France, and Russia, common forms of criminal
punishment included exile, banishment, and transportation (particularly by Britain
to the American and Australian colonies).21 5
211. See, e.g., James Madison, Madison 's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOtr's
DEBATES 546, 555 (1800), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html
("[If a banishment of this sort be not a punishment,.., it will be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name can be applied.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
212. Accord Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 17 (N.D. I11. 1975) ("[Sltands to lose his
residence, livelihood, and most importantly, his family ... ."), rev'd, No. 75-1393 (7th Cir. Jan.
27, 1976); see, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[L]oses
his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between their
father and their native country.... ."); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[L]oss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth
living. . . ."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,740(1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting)
("[F]orcibly taken away from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent
across the ocean to a distant land.. . ."); DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir.
1947) ("[N]othing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in these circumstances
is not punishment. .. ."); cf Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531 (acknowledging that the "intrinsic
consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime" but nonetheless concluding
deportation is not technically punishment).
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2006) (barring deported noncitizens from
readmission to the United States for a period of ten years or more, depending on the
circumstances of their deportation).
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (describing the termination of benefits); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) (holding that termination of social security benefits to deported aliens
does not offend due process).
215. See generally Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of
the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 115 (1999).
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A functional analysis is also possible. Thirty years ago I argued that the
theories of deportation overlapped substantially, albeit incompletely, with the
theories of punishment; it follows, I suggested, that deportation can sometimes be a
form of punishment.1 6 On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has
supported its conclusion that deportation is not punishment with nothing more than
the mantra that the purpose of deportation is to rid the country of undesirables.21 7
The Supreme Court's reasoning does not adequately distinguish criminal
punishment, as one of the leading theories of most forms of criminal punishment is
incapacitation-the isolation of the undesirable offender from society. 218 Other
theories of criminal punishment include both specific and general deterrence-
theories that, again, could as easily be invoked in defense of deportation.2 9 The
retribution rationale for criminal punishment admittedly has less universal
application to deportation, but even retribution might well come into play when
deportation is predicated upon the commission of an independent wrong, rather than
the remedying of an immigration status violation.
220
For the distinction between deportations based on immigration violations and
those based on post-entry criminal conduct, we are indebted to Daniel Kanstroom,
who argues that the latter deportations should be viewed as forms of punishment
and treated accordingly.22' I would add that a strong, albeit less powerful, case
could be made even for those deportations that are predicated upon unlawful entry
or violation of the conditions imposed at the time of entry. The elements of
retribution, concededly, are less likely to be present, but the same deterrence and
216. Accord Demleitner, supra note 1, at 1068-71 (identifying some of the subtle
limitations on the benefits of deportation and some of the external and internal costs); see
Legomsky, supra note 1, at 121-22 (discussing similarities between deportation and punishment
in theory, justification, and practical effect); Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment, supra note 1, at 1894 (same); see also Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as
Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution 's Criminal Procedure Protections Must
Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 305, 337-44 (2000) (arguing that deportations on certain grounds
should be regarded as punishment within the meaning of certain constitutional provisions).
217. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("[R]id the country of persons
[whose] continued presence here would not make for the safety or welfare of society.");
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ("[Rjefusal by the government to harbor
persons whom it does not want.").
218. See Legomsky, supra note 1, at 125-27 (criticizing the Supreme Court's attempted
distinction between deportation and punishment on the grounds that the Court fails to identify a
government purpose which applies to one action and not the other).
219. See id. at 123-24 (applying author's criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning,
supra note 217-18 and accompanying text, to the theory of deterrence).
220. See id. at 121-23 (applying author's criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning,
supra note 217-18 and accompanying text, to the theory of retributive punishment).
221. See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, supra note 1, at 1898
(arguing that post-conviction deportations are primarily punitive).
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incapacitation arguments that surface in criminal cases might be at work here.
Congress might well feel that the threat of deportation, with all its long-term effects,
deters unlawful entries or violations of the terms of one's admittance. Or Congress
might feel that, because the immigration admission criteria are designed to screen
out those whose presence would not be beneficial, and because individuals who
violate U.S. immigration laws are likely to do so because they do not meet the
criteria for legal entry, the removal of immigration violators effectively isolates the
American public from whatever harms the admission criteria were meant to
prevent-i.e., incapacitation.
B. What's in a Name?
As courts and commentators have expended considerable energy discussing
whether deportation can be a form of punishment,222 the natural question is why it
matters. This subsection identifies three contexts in which the rejection of the
criminal punishment label in the adjudication of deportation cases has had profound
effects on both the administration of the deportation regime and the outcomes of
individual cases.
First and most directly, certain constitutional rights operate only in criminal
proceedings; the courts have explicitly invoked the civil regulatory model of
deportation to hold those rights inapplicable to deportation. The list of rejected
rights includes double jeopardy,223 Miranda warnings,224 the privilege against self-
inination,221 trial byjury,226 restrictions on bills of attainder,227 the prohibition
222. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the judicial controversy over
whether deportation is punishment).
223. See Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to apply double
jeopardy to the civil deportation proceeding).
224. See Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply
the Federal Rules of Evidence to a deportation hearing).
225. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in any
proceeding, including a deportation hearing. The person must be able to assert, however, that
the statement would tend to expose him or her to criminal culpability; it is not enough to assert
that the statement would facilitate deportation, since the latter, being civil, would not constitute
"incrimination." See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Hello, Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and
Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599 (1990) (discussing
the lack of ordinary constitutional and evidentiary protection in deportation hearings).
226. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (concluding that the
nonpunitive nature of deportation obviates the need for constitutional safeguards in the
deportation process),
227. See Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the mandatory
deportation of Nazi war criminals because deportation does not fall into the category of
legislative punishment, a prerequisite for finding a bill of attainder).
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of ex post facto laws,228 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 229 and the ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. 3° Certain other constitutional safeguards,
such as the exclusionary rule and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, have been extended to a handful of civil contexts, but they too have been
held inapplicable to deportation proceedings.231
The assumption that deportation is not punishment has influenced
outcomes in a second context as well. Noncitizen criminal defendants have
often moved to withdraw their guilty pleas on the ground that they were not
"knowing"; the trial judge had not informed the defendant that the resulting
conviction could lead to deportation.232 Absent a statutory requirement to the
contrary, the courts have consistently upheld the denials of those motions,
reasoning that deportation is merely a "collateral" consequence of the plea, not
a "direct" consequence such as the length of the sentence or other components
of the criminal punishment.233 The unstated assumption is that deportation-
228. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,593-96 (1952) (upholding legislation
making past Communist Party members deportable because, among other reasons, the ex post
facto clause forbids only retroactive criminal punishment, not deportation).
229. SeeVides-Videsv. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at government expense in deportation proceedings);
United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); Burquez v. INS, 513
F.2d 751,755 (10th Cir. 1975) (same). But see Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 572-
74 (6th Cir. 1975) (DeMascio, D.J., dissenting) (discussing the possibility that Fifth
Amendment due process might require the appointment of counsel to an indigent noncitizen in a
particular deportation case if fairness so dictates).
230. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment does not restrict deportation because it is not punishment); Briseno v. INS,
192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975)
(same).
231. As for the exclusionary rule, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). The
Supreme Court has held that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in at least
one technically civil context, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile delinquency
proceedings), but has rejected such a requirement in most other civil contexts, including
specifically deportation cases, Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
232. Some states have now enacted legislation requiring a trial judge to advise of the
possibility of deportation before accepting a guilty plea. See Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas by
Non-Citizens in Illinois: Immigration Consequences Reconsidered, 53 DEPAULL. REV. 19,49-
50 (2003) (discussing how mandatory notice statutes are evolving); John J. Francis, Failure to
Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Should This Be
Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 MICH. J. L. REFORM 691, 694 (2003) (discussing the
general problem of "knowing" pleas and listing state statutes requiring that defendants be
advised of the potential for deportation).
233. The leading case, and one of the more dramatic, is United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d
919 (2d Cir. 1954). There the criminal defendant, a long-term lawful permanent resident of the
United States, asked his criminal defense attorney-a former Commissioner of Immigration-
whether a guilty plea could lead to deportation. Id. at 920-21. Although the law was clear that
the particular criminal conviction was a ground for deportation, the attorney replied that
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even when imposed solely because of the person's commission of a crime-is
not part of the punishment.
Because the courts have uniformly rejected any nonstatutory duty of the
trial judge to advise of possible deportation consequences, defendants in the
more recent cases have generally argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The
theory is that it was the job of the criminal defense attorney to provide the
necessary advice. Absent affirmative "misadvice" by the attorney, most courts
deny that claim as well, again on the ground that deportation is merely a
"collateral" consequence rather than a part of the criminal sentence or other
234"direct" consequence.
A third context in which the civil regulatory model of deportation law has
had far-reaching effects is the adjudication machinery. Neither the Constitution
nor any other law requires trials of deportation cases before independent Article
III courts.235 Today, the original hearing is held before an "immigration judge,"
under the auspices of the Justice Department's Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR).236 Either the noncitizen or the government may
appeal the immigration judge's decision, as of right, to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), also part of EOIR.237 Certain deportation
decisions, but not all, are reviewable by the courts of appeals upon petition by
the noncitizen.238
In the past few years this two-tiered system of administrative adjudication
subject to judicial review has come under fierce attack. I have recently argued
elsewhere that a series of steps taken by the Attorney General in 2002 and 2003
deportation would not result. Id. at 921. On that assurance, the defendant pleaded guilty. Id.
He was later ordered deported on the basis of the resulting conviction. Id. The court denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, reasoning that "the claimed surprise was not of the severity
of the sentence directly flowing from the judgment but a collateral consequence thereof, namely
deportability." Id. Accord Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
Steinsvik "was not prejudiced even if he were not fully aware of the potential sentence prior to
the entry of his plea"); United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 789-90, 790 n.4 (2d Cir.
1973) (referencing Second Circuit precedent "refusing to allow a defendant who was unaware
that a plea of guilty would subject him to deportation, to withdraw his plea even prior to
sentencing").
234. For numerous examples and a critique of the rule, see generally Rob A. Justman, The
Effects ofAEDPA and llRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise
Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an "Aggravated Felony,"
2004 UTAH L. REv. 701.
235. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("[T]he provisions of
the constitution, securing the right to trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures and cruel and unusual punishment have no application [to deportation proceedings].").
236. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(1) (2006).
237. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0(a), 1003.1(b)(3) (2006).
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000).
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have eroded the job security, and therefore the decisional independence, of
immigration judges and BIA members alike.2 39 Further, over the past ten years,
Congress has steadily added more exceptions to the courts' power to review
those administrative orders once they are final. 240 The whole, I argued, is
greater than the sum of its parts. The combination of draining the decisional
independence from the administrative phase of the deportation process and
stripping the federal courts of their power to review important categories of
deportation orders means there now exist broad categories of deportation cases
in which the entire process is bereft of decisional independence. 24' The point to
add here is that all of this would be unthinkable in criminal cases. On the
assumption that this is so, then the legitimacy of dispensing with independent
adjudicators in deportation cases must hinge, again, on the characterization of
deportation as a civil sanction rather than a form of criminal punishment.
V. So What?
The preceding subparts expose a sharp contrast between the steady
importation of the criminal enforcement model into immigration law and the
equally steady rejection of the procedural safeguards that constitute the criminal
adjudication model. To be clear, both halves of this dichotomy generate public
benefits. Law enforcement is a vital responsibility of any government. Time-
tested enforcement strategies drawn from the criminal justice system can
enhance those efforts. Conversely, the civil regulatory stamp that both the
courts and the political branches have imprinted on deportation proceedings
serves useful functions as well. Not all the procedural safeguards required for
criminal cases are necessary or even desirable in deportation cases.
But both components of what I have called asymmetric incorporation have
costs as well, and the interaction of the two components exacerbates those
costs. This Part starts with the particularized costs that attend some of the
specific incorporated features. These costs add up to the more general, less
tangible harms described next. This Part concludes with a plea for making the
civil regulatory model the foundation for both the enforcement and the
adjudication components of modern immigration law.
239. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 369, 371-79 (2006).
240. See id. at 380-84 (describing the impact of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)).
241. See id. at 384-85 (discussing the demise of decisional independence in deportation
proceedings).
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A. The Specific Costs of Asymmetric Incorporation
Parts II.A and II.B of this Article identified two of the five ports through
which modem immigration law has increasingly incorporated the criminal
enforcement model. Part II.A pointed out that far more immigration violations
have been made federal criminal offenses, that the sentences for the existing
immigration-related offenses have steadily increased, and that the number of
federal criminal prosecutions of immigration violators has skyrocketed. 242 Part
II.B. described the converse-a wider range of federal and state criminal
offenses that now give rise to deportation and far greater numbers of such
deportation cases.243
There is nothing inherently wrong with imposing both criminal and civil
24sanctions for the same misconduct; it happens in numerous contexts.2  The
combination might well be an effective way to enhance the particular
legislation's deterrence and incapacitation objectives. The question in all these
contexts is whether the dual consequences are reasonably proportionate to the
misconduct. In the case of deportation based on a criminal conviction, at least
two arguments might suggest that they are not.
The more radical argument would be that deportation is always excessive
once the person has served his or her criminal sentence. When the legislature
prescribed a minimum or maximum sentence for a given crime, it had to make
a judgment about how much retribution the misconduct warrants, how large a
deterrent is necessary, and for how long the person will need to be incapacitated
before the danger is likely to have subsided to an acceptable level. Because the
vast majority of the offenders are bound to be U.S. citizens 245 who cannot be
deported, the sentence the legislature chose should be assumed to have
reflected its determination that the criminal sentence alone imposes an optimal
degree of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation for the particular offense.
If that is so, then any additional sanction is by definition excessive. One might
reply that deportation of criminal offenders is aimed not at any of those
objectives, but only at ridding the country of those noncitizens whose presence
is deemed undesirable. But that rationale is simply a version of
242. See supra Part II.A (discussing the shift from civil removal proceedings to criminal
sanctions).
243. See supra Part II.B (discussing the trend toward deportation upon a criminal
conviction).
244. For example, tort liability for conduct already punished as a crime, tax fraud,
securities fraud, or welfare fraud.
245. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing studies of immigration's
impact on crime rates).
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incapacitation-isolating the offender from society-and the level of
incapacitation already reflected in the criminal sentence should, as noted, be
what the legislature regarded as sufficient.
Acceptance of that argument would bar all deportations on grounds of
criminal convictions-a most unlikely outcome. A more realistic argument,
therefore, is that at least some of the crime-related deportations are grossly out
of proportion to the underlying misconduct. Earlier discussion has already
recounted the potential consequences of deportation for the noncitizen;
depending on one's personal circumstances, the severity level can range from
minor annoyance to the loss "of all that makes life worth living. '246 Earlier
discussion has also described the stunning range of crimes to which the label
"aggravated felony" has now been appended, as well as the sweeping effects of
categorizing a crime as an aggravated felony.247 In a number of troubling cases,
long-term lawful permanent residents have been ordered deported because of
criminal convictions that virtually all observers would regard as trivial
violations.248
To the extent the deportation of a particular criminal offender is deserved,
one cannot describe the deportation as a net social harm. But in the growing
number of cases in which the severity of the deportation sanction exceeds what
is appropriate for the particular misconduct, the excess represents a cost, or
harm, of over-reliance on the criminal enforcement model.
Other harms have resulted from another offshoot of the criminal
enforcement model, the extensive use of preventive detention in the context of
deportation proceedings. 249 Detention, like deportation, has costs. They
include all the obvious human costs to the detainee-the deprivation of liberty;
the inability to work, attend school, or socialize with family and friends; and the
obstacles to assistance of counsel and to the preparation of one's legal case.25°
Some additional costs are borne by others-one's family, financial dependents,
246. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 211-14 and accompanying text (describing the potential severity of deportation or
banishment).
247. See supra Part II.B (discussing the trend toward deportation upon a criminal
conviction).
248. See supra note 76 (citing cases of trivial violations leading to deportation
proceedings); see also Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a
removal order against a paraplegic Cambodian native convicted of assaulting a police officer).
249. See supra Part II.D. 1 (discussing the implications of preventive detention policies).
250. See Legomsky, supra note 97, at 541-42 (describing "private sector" costs of
detention).
THE NEW PATH OF IMMIGRATION LAW
and community. 25' Still other costs are borne by the public at large, for
detention is not cheap.252
Again, when the benefits of detention justify the costs, detention cannot be
claimed as a net social harm. As noted elsewhere, however, the government
has been making heavily increased use of mandatory detention-i.e., automatic
preventive detention of predesignated categories of noncitizens awaiting
deportation proceedings.253 Some members of the designated classes will
inevitably be dangerous or likely to abscond; others will not. Without
individualized assessments of the need to detain, therefore, the latter will be
detained unnecessarily. To that extent, the substantial private and public costs
of preventive detention are not offset by any accompanying benefits and thus
represent an additional social cost. When the detention is for an indefinite
duration, as it often now is, that cost is magnified.254 And when the detainees
are asylum applicants seeking refuge from the trauma of persecution, the
human cost becomes more considerable still.
255
Part II.D.2 above described the growing use of plea-bargaining
arrangements in immigration law.256 Nora Demleitner, while acknowledging
the potential benefits these arrangements can bring, has also identified a
number of unintended but concrete harms257 that need not be rehashed here. Of
greater concern, given the vulnerabilities of the persons involved, is the recent
use of plea-bargaining in asylum cases; the results can be highly unnerving.258
Previous discussion also described the rapidly growing federal reliance on
state and local police to assist in enforcing immigration laws.25 9 There are
clearly some enforcement advantages to inter-sovereign cooperation in law
enforcement, but even one of its most ardent supporters acknowledges
countervailing costs. These include discouraging immigrants from cooperating
with local police, diverting police resources from other enforcement functions,
providing inadequate training and expertise of state and local police in
251. Id.
252. See id. at 542 (outlining "public sector" costs of detention).
253. See id. at 543-48 (discussing policy implications of mandatory detention policies).
254. See supra Part II.D. 1 (discussing the implications of preventive detention policies).
255. Id.
256. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing a form of plea bargaining by which minor criminals
may not face deportation if they assist the government in catching major criminals).
257. See generally Demleitner, supra note 1, at 1084-93.
258. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the consequences of criminal-style plea bargaining
in immigration cases).
259. See supra Part II.E. I (discussing the "inherent authority" doctrine).
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immigration law, and increasing the likelihood of racial or other inappropriate
profiling.26°
Dangers also reside in the expanded role of federal sentencing judges in
deportation determinations. While entrusting those determinations to federal
judges creates no inherent disadvantages for the noncitizen criminal defendant,
the procedural particulars have been unidirectional; they have left noncitizen
defendants with fewer procedural advantages than their prosecutorial
261adversaries.
This Article earlier described the massive transfer of immigration
functions from the Department of Justice to the new Department of Homeland
Security in 2002.262 That transfer, it was suggested, both reflects and reinforces
public perceptions of a link between immigration and terrorism. In addition,
one can safely assume that the leadership of that Department will be publicly
judged, above all else, by its success in combating terrorism-not by its success
in facilitating the immigration process for those who qualify. It would be
unnatural to expect Departmental policies and priorities not to reflect those
political realities. Under those circumstances, the potential harm from relative
inattention to serving immigrants is self-evident.
Apart from these potentially adverse consequences of importing specific
criminal enforcement strategies into immigration law, the continuing rejection
of the criminal adjudication model in deportation cases has caused problems of
its own. They were explored in Part IV above and stem from three sources.
The consistent refusal of the courts to classify deportation as punishment has
263rendered a catalog of constitutional rights inoperative in deportation cases.
The labeling of deportation as a merely "collateral" consequence of a guilty
plea-rather than a "direct" consequence such as the criminal sentence itself-
has prevented many a noncitizen defendant from withdrawing the guilty plea on
which deportation eventually rested.264  And the measures taken by the
260. See Kobach, supra note 136, at 182 n.13 (summarizing articulated concerns over
states' inherent authority to make immigration arrests). As for the statutory and constitutional
permissibility of using state and local police to enforce federal immigration laws, see generally
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local
Enforcement of the Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REv. 965
(2004). See also Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 663-69
(discussing the immigration laws' implications for state and local law enforcement).
261. See supra Part II.E.2 (summarizing roles of federal sentencing judges in deportation
cases).
262. See supra Part III.C (discussing links between immigration and terrorism).
263. See supra notes 223-31 and accompanying text (providing a list of rejected rights).
264. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text (explaining courts' treatment of this
issue).
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executive branch in eroding the decisional independence of the officials who
adjudicate deportation cases, combined with Congress's steady narrowing of
the availability of judicial review, cause analogous problems that would not
have been possible under a criminal adjudication model.265 As explained in the
next subpart, it does not follow that the civil regulatory model of deportation
adjudication should be jettisoned; reforms are desirable, but I argue there that
those reforms are possible even within a civil regulatory construct.
B. The More General Harms
The foregoing are examples of specific harms actually or potentially
arising from what I have called the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice
norms into immigration law. From these specific concerns one can distill some
broader and more worrisome patterns.
First, immigration policy is about more than enforcement. At the macro
level, we should be devoting as much attention to deciding whom we want to
welcome and how best to facilitate their admission and their subsequent
integration as we do to deciding whom we want to exclude or deport and how
best to enforce their removal. And on the issues of whom to admit and how
best to do it, there is no shortage of sometimes competing policy objectives.
Positive goals such as family reunification, economic growth, building a
younger workforce, meeting the labor needs of employers and industries,
protecting refugees, fostering both cultural diversity and successful integration,
and promoting healthy foreign relations sometimes compete with such other
goals as protecting the jobs and wages of domestic workers, population control
and environmental protection, public health and safety, national security,
national sovereignty and border integrity, and adherence to the rule of law.
When the national preoccupation with enforcement reaches the extreme that
this Article has suggested it has, a full and robust balancing of this broad range
of objectives becomes impossible. The consequence, inevitably, is an
unhealthy skewing of both the thought process and the actual resource
allocation on which a more balanced set of policy results and the overall
national interest depend.
Second, the asymmetric importation of criminal justice norms into
immigration law prevents proportionate treatment at the micro level. The
problems are ones of both substantive proportion and procedural fairness.
Substantively, the narrow focus on enforcement leads to penalties that are often
265. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (reviewing this problem).
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cruelly excessive in relation to the transgressions. The relentless expansions of
the list of crimes that render even long-term lawfully admitted permanent
residents deportable, coupled with the narrowing of the grounds on which
compassionate discretionary relief can be dispensed in deserving cases, as well
as the other developments described in this Article, mean that the most trivial
misstep can result in devastating loss with no possibility of discretionary relief.
Procedurally, the combination of harsh penalties borrowed from the
criminal enforcement model and rejection of the procedural safeguards
embodied in the criminal adjudication model leaves a disturbing imbalance.
When the personal stakes are high, the risk of error should be kept
correspondingly low. Asymmetric incorporation has given immigration law
precisely the opposite.
Finally, asymmetric incorporation is a breeding ground for inaccurate and
destructive stereotypes. As elaborated more fully in Part III of this Article, the
public erroneously believes both that most immigration to the United States is
illegal and that immigrants generally are more prone to crime than the native-
born.266 Apart from whatever influence those stereotypes have had in the
formulation of federal immigration policy in such areas as admission,
expulsion, and asylum, it seems clear that the stereotypes have helped fuel an
avalanche of impulsive and uninformed state and local forays into immigration
policy.
C. Restoring the Civil Regulatory Model
Harms have resulted from combining the harsh criminal-like penalties and
enforcement methods of the criminal justice model with the less exacting
procedural safeguards of the civil regulatory model. The converse would be an
immigration system that de-emphasizes criminal enforcement but embodies the
procedural safeguards of criminal adjudication. Such a system would not be
inherently contradictory. When the consequences of removal are severe-no
matter how thoroughly deserved in a particular case-the risk of error assumes
greater importance and procedural safeguards thereby become more vital.
Thus, a case could certainly be made for precisely the opposite of what we have
today-i.e., rejecting the criminal enforcement model while incorporating the
procedures associated with criminal adjudication.
But I do not argue here for such a system. My view is that the civil
regulatory model should be the guiding star of immigration law with respect to
266. See supra Part III (describing how the perception of immigrants as criminals
influences current trends toward criminalization of illegal immigration).
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both enforcement and adjudication. With respect to enforcement, the severe
results of importing the criminal justice model into immigration law have been
amply examined in Part II of this Article and synthesized in the present section.
With respect to adjudication, the question is closer. Even there, the civil
regulatory model seems preferable and should be retained.
The practical problems with importing the criminal adjudication
machinery into immigration would be staggering. In 2004, more than 200,000
noncitizens were removed from the United States, the vast majority for lack of a
valid immigration status.267 To add those cases to the annual dockets of the
federal Article III courts would be unimaginable. Nor, for the routine cases that
involve unauthorized entry or overstay, do juries seem essential.
In rejecting the criminal adjudication model in deportation cases, however,
the courts have blessed a variety of results that do not coexist easily with
commonly held notions of fundamental fairness. As Part IV explains, the
depiction of deportation as a purely civil penalty has rendered inoperative all
the constitutional rights that are confined to the realm of criminal punishment,
has prompted courts to deny requests to withdraw guilty pleas for lack of
knowledge of the deportation consequences because the latter are merely
"collateral," and has made possible the loss of decisional independence during
the administrative phases of deportation proceedings and the loss of judicial
review in selected subcategories of those cases.268 One might ask whether the
criminal adjudication model should be extended to deportation for the purpose
of avoiding those sorts of results.
It is unnecessary to do that, however, because all of those problems could
be fixed without jettisoning the civil regulatory model in deportation cases.
While most of the constitutional rights that courts have held inapplicable to
deportation have indeed been the sole province of criminal adjudication, some
have not. Both the exclusionary rule 269 and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,270 for example, have been rejected in deportation cases even
267. DHS, Table 42, supra note 80.
268. See supra Part IV (discussing the courts' understanding of deportation as civil rather
than punitive).
269. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045-50 (1984) (explaining why
deportation is among the civil contexts in which the exclusionary rule is applied).
270. The Supreme Court has held that, in a civil proceeding to adjudicate juvenile
delinquency, the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) ("[T]he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is... required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding .. "). Yet in
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), the Court had explicitly rejected the criminal standard of
proof and adopted instead the less stringent "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence"
standard for deportation proceedings. Id. at 286.
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though applied in some other civil contexts. There is no reason in principle that
deportation could not be one of the civil contexts in which at least some of
those rights operate. Moreover, even when a specific constitutional right is
held inoperative in deportation proceedings, a near equivalent is sometimes
available. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is limited to criminal
proceedings, but the courts have said that Fifth Amendment due process would
require the appointment of counsel in a deportation case if, on the facts of the
case, counsel is essential to fundamental fairness.27' If they were so inclined,
the courts could seize that opening to require appointed counsel in cases where
the deportees are lawful permanent residents or where the substantive
individual interests at stake are otherwise compelling or where crucial questions
of fact or law demand legal expertise.
Similarly, when a criminal defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea on
the ground that he or she was unaware of the deportation consequences, the
courts do not have to hold either that plea withdrawals will be denied whenever
the unknown consequences were merely "collateral" or that for this purpose
deportation is collateral. Both principles are, after all, judicial inventions.
Several state legislatures have passed statutes that require judges to advise
defendants of possible deportation consequences before accepting their guilty
pleas.272 A court could take the similar view that, in light of the potential
severity of deportation, the defendant should be permitted to withdraw a guilty
plea that was entered without knowledge of that possibility. Because the
withdrawal of the plea would free the prosecution from the bargain and allow it
to reinstate the original higher charges, a defendant who moves to withdraw a
guilty plea is taking a chance.273 If he or she is willing to accept that higher
risk, a court might wish to allow that opportunity.
The absence of decisional independence similarly is not inevitable in civil
proceedings. The Constitution explicitly contemplates civil trials in federal
271. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The test for
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide fundamental fairness--the
touchstone of due process.") (citations omitted).
272. See Bogdan, supra note 232, at 21 ("[Tjwenty states have recognized that immigration
consequences of criminal convictions have serious effects that require trial judges to advise
defendants that immigration consequences may result from pleading guilty to a criminal
charge."); Francis, supra note 232, at 693 ("Without knowing all the consequences of a guilty
plea, it is difficult for a defendant to make an informed decision .... ").
273. See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919,926 (2nd Cir. 1954) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(observing that the long-term lawful permanent resident defendant had already completed his
prison term and, since the original charges could be reinstated if the guilty plea were withdrawn,
was willing to risk the death penalty rather than accept deportation).
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Article III courts.2 7 4 In addition, a wide variety of federal administrative agency
proceedings are conducted by administrative law judges (ALJs), who possess
greater job security, and therefore greater decisional independence, than the
immigration judges and BIA members who adjudicate deportation cases. 2 75
Nor is the civil nature of deportation a reason to strip the Article III courts of
their jurisdiction to review designated categories of deportation orders, as the
courts' jurisdiction to review other deportation orders 276 and a range of other
"civil" administrative agency decisions 277 attests.
I recognize that much of this subpart has an air of unreality to it. The
alternatives I have offered, while theoretically possible under a civil regulatory
model, do not appear to be on the horizon. If the courts were inclined to pursue
them, I suspect they would have done so by now. This must be acknowledged.
But if the mild adjustments suggested here are thought unrealistic, surely it is
all the more unrealistic to expect the courts to overrule a century of case law
and suddenly declare deportation to be a punitive sanction that requires the
entire arsenal of constitutional rights available in criminal proceedings. The
recommended course, therefore, is the general use of the civil regulatory model
for both the enforcement and the adjudication components of immigration
law-but, with respect to adjudication, a more flexible use of the fair procedure
vehicles available in other civil settings.
VI. Conclusion
Starting about twenty years ago, and accelerating more recently, a clear
trend has come to define modern immigration law. The trend, noted in recent
scholarship,27 8 has sometimes been dubbed the "criminalization" of
immigration law. The term connotes the incorporation of criminal justice
principles into a domain that previously had been conceived as civil in nature.
This Article argues, however, that the new path has embraced the criminal
justice model only asymmetrically. The asymmetry, it is submitted, has
274. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (requiring a jury trial in any common law suit where
more than $20 is at stake).
275. Compare Legomsky, supra note 239, at 372-79 (describing the vulnerability of
immigration judges and BIA members to reassignment), with Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You
Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REv. 203,
226 (2002) (describing the job protections of ALJs).
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
278. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the term "criminalization" of
immigration law).
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followed a pattern: Elements aligned with criminal enforcement have steadily
found their way into immigration law, while the procedural safeguards at the
core of criminal adjudication have been consciously rejected. Adjudication has
followed the civil regulatory model.
After establishing that asymmetric incorporation is indeed what has
occurred, this Article further argues that that trend has had some disturbing
effects. Some of those effects are just specific results of particular policy
decisions. Those specific results, however, both illustrate and together
comprise a set of broader concerns about the nature of immigration
policymaking and the direction of future events.
These broader concerns relate to balance. Through their almost exclusive
emphasis on policing and enforcement, immigration policymakers have denied
themselves the benefits of important competing perspectives. At the macro
level, they have paid far too little attention to the positive goals of substantive
immigration policy or to the government machinery for facilitating lawful
immigration and successful integration. At the micro level, they have been so
preoccupied with enhancing penalties and closing loopholes that the penalties
are too often cruelly disproportionate to the transgressions. Combined with the
courts' rejection of the criminal adjudication model and its procedural
safeguards, the single-minded focus on enforcement has also left noncitizens in
deportation proceedings exposed to large risks of error when the personal
stakes are high.
Taken as a whole, these developments skew the results in ways that
impede the fullest and most productive use of our national immigration
resources. This Article urges a return to the civil regulatory model of
immigration law-for enforcement and adjudication alike. Only then can we
hope to devise an immigration policy that is at once balanced, moderate, fair,
humane, and, ultimately, faithful to all the values that together constitute the
national interest.
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